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Detecting the Stealth Erosion of 
Precedent:                               
Affirmative Action After Ricci 
Sachin S. Pandya† 
This paper presents a method for detecting stealth precedent erosion, 
i.e., when an appellate court majority deliberately writes the opinion in 
case y to reduce the scope of its precedent x, but does not expressly refer to 
precedent x in the opinion.  Applying this method, the paper provides a 
strong basis for concluding that in Ricci v. DeStefano (2009), a United 
States Supreme Court case decided under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, the Court majority eroded by stealth United Steelworkers of America 
v. Weber (1979), and Johnson v. Transportation Agency (1987), both cases 
that read Title VII to permit employers to consider race or sex in 
employment decisions pursuant to affirmative action plans.  In so doing, the 
paper contributes to research on the stare-decisis norm, fills a gap in the 
growing literature on the Ricci case, and identifies a critical development 
in the judicial treatment of employer affirmative action plans in the United 
States. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that, in deciding case y, some judges on a court want to 
remove the constraint posed by one of its prior cases (precedent x) but those 
judges lack enough desire or votes to overrule it.  A vast repertoire of 
strategies remains, such as “distinguishing” precedent x or separating its 
“holding” from its “dicta.”  Another is stealth precedent erosion:  Write the 
opinion in case y in a way contrary to what precedent x implies, but do not 
expressly refer to precedent x.  Then, in later cases, rely on y as precedent 
and ignore x, or disclaim the force of x by pointing to a “tension” between x 
and y.  It is an old idea that appellate judges sometimes do this.1 Yet, we 
know little about when, how often, or why they do, because it is hard to 
observe just by reading a court opinion. 
This paper makes two contributions.  First, it offers a method for 
detecting stealth precedent erosion, i.e., six criteria for judging whether it is 
more likely than not that stealth precedent erosion occurred in a particular 
case.  Most researchers estimate stare decisis’ influence by looking at when, 
how, or how often a court’s opinions expressly refer to and rely on 
precedent to justify its rulings.2  For this reason, if stealth precedent erosion 
 1. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 85 (1960).  
“Stealth precedent erosion” here does not refer to a court that expressly refers to a precedent and does 
not say that it has been overruled, even though, by some measure, the court effectively did so.  See 
Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 
GEO. L. J. 1 (2010). 
 2. See, e.g., THOMAS G. HANSFORD & JAMES F. SPRIGGS II, THE POLITICS OF PRECEDENT OF THE 
U.S. SUPREME COURT 43-50 (2006); HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR 
MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 25-33 (1999); James H. 
Fowler & Sangick Jeon, The Authority of Supreme Court Precedent, 30 SOC. NETWORKS 16 (2008); 
James H. Fowler et al., Network Analysis and the Law: Measuring the Legal Importance of Precedents 
at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 324 (2007); Jeffery T. Renz, Stare Decisis in Montana, 
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happens often, that research design misses many negative treatments of 
precedent.  The method presented here therefore contributes to research on 
judicial behavior. 
Second, applying this method, the paper concludes that in Ricci v. 
DeStefano (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court likely wrote the majority 
opinion in a way to erode by stealth the scope of United Steelworkers of 
America v. Weber (1979) and Johnson v. Transportation Agency (1987).3  
Weber and Johnson are the critical Supreme Court precedent for reading 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to permit employers making 
training, promotion, or other employment decisions to consider race or sex 
pursuant to valid affirmative action plans.  Some have already argued how 
Ricci could or should be read.4  A few more have argued that, after Ricci, 
judges could, should, or will read Weber and Johnson less favorably to 
employers.5  Yet no one has shown that the Court likely wrote Ricci in the 
way it did to deliberately erode Weber and Johnson so as to make it easier 
to later read Title VII to permit affirmative action plans only to remedy an 
employer’s own actual or arguable past discrimination. 
The paper proceeds as follows.  Part I presents the method for 
detecting stealth precedent erosion.  Part II partially applies that method to 
assess the claim that Ricci should be treated as an instance of stealth erosion 
of Weber and Johnson.  The Conclusion briefly discusses possible motives 
for using a strategy of stealth precedent erosion. 
I.  
THE METHOD 
This Part presents six criteria that, taken together, are a facially valid 
basis for inferring whether case y is an instance of stealth erosion of 
precedent x.  Each of the first three criteria must be satisfied.  The other 
three criteria concern only the strength of the inference.  The method 
65 MONT. L. REV. 41 (2004); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976). 
 3. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 
443 U.S. 193 (1979); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).  On Weber and Johnson, see 
Deborah C. Malamud, The Story of United Steelworkers of America v. Brian Weber, in EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION STORIES 173 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006); and MELVIN I. UROFSKY, AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION ON TRIAL: SEX DISCRIMINATION IN JOHNSON V. SANTA CLARA (1997). 
 4. See, e.g., Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341 (2010); 
Joseph Seiner & Benjamin N. Gutman, Does Ricci Herald a New Disparate Impact?, 90 BOSTON U. L. 
REV. 2181 (2010); Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: White(ning) 
Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 73 (2010). 
 5. See, e.g., Roger Clegg, Dousing the Fires of Racial Discrimination, Clarion Call, July 28, 
2009, www.popecenter.org/clarion_call/article.html?id=2209; Juan Williams, Affirmative Action’s 
Untimely Obituary, WASH. POST, July 26, 2009, at B1; cf. George Rutherglen, Ricci v. DeStefano: 
Affirmative Action and the Lessons of Adversity, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 83, 113 n.62 (observing that Weber 
was “conspicuously not cited in any of the opinions in Ricci.”). 
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requires only court opinions and parties’ legal briefs, and that one knows 
the legal field underlying precedent x and case y. 
A. A Stare Decisis Norm Exists 
First, the researcher must determine whether a stare decisis norm exists 
in the court under study. If it does exist there,6 we should observe regular 
citations and arguments from prior cases of that court in briefs, in court 
opinions (majority and dissent) and, if available, in internal correspondence 
among judges.7  Some court practices expressly depend on stare decisis, 
such as, for example, en banc rehearing in the federal courts of appeal, and 
this in turn should lead to practices consistent with that norm, such as 
arguments about circuit precedent in en banc rehearing petitions.8 
That a stare decisis norm exists, however, does not necessarily imply 
how or how much it constrains what judges do.  For example, Spaeth and 
Segal suggest that, even if the norm does not constrain Supreme Court 
Justices in their decisions, those Justices would still cite to and argue from 
precedent to each other and to readers of published court opinions.  Doing 
so helps secure legitimacy by “cloak[ing]” policy preferences in “legal 
language, including rules of law and precedent.”  They may also use 
precedent to convince themselves of the propriety of outcomes they already 
prefer.9 
In contrast, Knight and Epstein argue that if Supreme Court Justices 
knowingly act based on reasons “to maintain the ‘myth’ of the rule of law,” 
such as securing societal legitimacy, then “those reasons have a causal 
effect on the decisions of the Court.”  Moreover, attorneys and Justices 
persist in strategically invoking precedent only because it actually helps 
“caus[e] others to accept their own preferred position,” and this can happen 
only because at least some of those “others actually believe the importance 
of the norm.”10 
 6. See Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850, 
3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 28 (1959) (arguing that there was no stare decisis norm before 1800). 
 7. Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1018 (1996). 
 8. Consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a)(1), every circuit court requires en 
banc rehearing to overrule circuit precedent, absent narrow exceptions, such as an intervening change in 
law.  See Michael Duvall, Resolving Intra-Circuit Splits in the Federal Courts of Appeal, 3 FED. CTS. L. 
REV. 17, 18 (2009); but see Amy E. Sloan, The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Stealth Procedures and the 
Erosion of Stare Decisis in the Federal Courts of Appeal, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 713 (2009) (describing 
use of “informal” en banc procedures). 
 9. SPAETH & SEGAL, supra note 2, at 43-44. 
 10. Knight & Epstein, supra note 7, at 1033. 
PANDYA MACRO 4 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2011  4:00:35 PM 
2010 DETECTING THE STEALTH EROSION OF PRECEDENT 289 
 
B. Arguments From Precedent 
Second, the researcher must determine whether in case y, at least one 
party’s legal brief(s) or a judge’s dissent expressly refers to precedent x in 
support of its position on an issue that the court majority actually decides, 
but the court does not refer to precedent x in deciding that issue.  
Stealth precedent erosion cannot be validly or reliably inferred only 
from a silence in a court opinion.  Which past case did the court not discuss 
but should have?  And how does one know that the court’s omission was 
intended, not inadvertent?   
This criterion presumes that, given a stare decisis norm, judges writing 
or joining the majority opinion are more likely than not to feel non-
negligibly compelled to address properly-raised arguments from precedent.  
Stare decisis, if it exists in a court, at least entails a burden on that court’s 
judges to justify a decision as consistent with prior rulings with status as 
precedent.  Judges who sincerely accept the stare decisis norm are likely to 
feel this way, even if they disagree with the particular argument.  And 
judges who insincerely perform fealty to the norm are likely to act as if they 
feel this way for the same strategic reasons they feel compelled to invoke 
precedent generally. 
However, courts need not decide all the legal issues that they could 
when deciding cases.  For this reason, the stare decisis norm does not entail 
a burden on judges to expressly address every precedent that a party 
invokes.  Accordingly, this criterion requires reading the parties’ briefs to 
identify the issue for which the party has invoked the precedent and to 
determine whether the court actually decided that issue in its opinion.  In 
this respect, the approach requires more work than research that counts how 
many citations from parties’ briefs also appear in the court opinion.11  The 
tradeoff is a stronger basis for inferring stealth precedent erosion. 
To be sure, in some cases, researchers may disagree that a court has 
addressed a party’s arguments from precedent.  That issue might arise, for 
example, for courts opinions that conclude with a sentence that the court 
has considered all the “remaining” arguments and has found them 
meritless.12 
 11. See, e.g., THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION 
GATHERING IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 132-36 (1978); Frank B. Cross, Chief Justice Roberts and 
Precedent: A Preliminary Study, 86  N.C. L. REV. 1251, 1274 tbl.3 (2008); William H. Manz, Citations 
in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A Comparative Study, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 267, 272 tbl. 6 (2002).  
Cross raised, but did not pursue, the idea “that cases cited by the briefs of both parties, but ignored by 
the Court's opinion, might imply some affirmative avoidance of the decision.” Cross, supra at 1276. 
 12. See, e.g., Arumaichsothylingam v. Holder, 363 Fed. Appx. 836 (2d Cir. 2010) (“We have 
considered Arumaichsothylingam's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.”).  In some 
variants, the court hedges on whether it rejects the “remaining” arguments on procedure or on the merits.  
See, e.g., People v. Vaughns, 894 N.Y.S.2d 234, 235 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (“To the extent that 
defendant's remaining contentions are properly before us, they have been reviewed and are determined 
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Moreover, access to legal briefs remains uneven, particularly for State 
courts and older cases.  Submitting written briefs to appellate courts appears 
to have arisen only in the mid-nineteenth century.13 This criterion therefore 
excludes outright court opinions decided before written briefs became 
regularly submitted and preserved. 
Finally, this criterion assumes that judges in fact carefully read the 
legal briefs submitted (or draft dissents circulated).  Relax this assumption, 
and the researcher has to consider conditions under which judges are likely 
to miss arguments about precedent x in legal briefs, such as high docket 
loads or poor lawyer communication. 
C. Court’s Reasoning Contravenes Precedent 
Third, the court’s reasoning in case y contradicts a plausibly necessary 
implication of precedent x.  An implication of a precedent x is plausibly 
necessary if and only if most lawyers in the relevant legal field would have 
taken that to be so at the time case y was being litigated.  By focusing only 
on plausible necessary implications, this approach avoids the often 
contested question of which case similarities or differences should matter 
for deciding whether different cases are alike enough to be treated in the 
same way. 
In practice, however, it may be hard to know what lawyers at some 
point in the past believed about any particular precedent’s implications.  If 
case y is old enough, all the practicing lawyers at that time may now be 
dead.  Contemporaneous writings of legal commentators are not necessarily 
representative. 
Accordingly, this criterion assumes that the norms for reading legal 
opinions have remained largely stable over time and, in any event, 
accessible to researchers.14  Once familiar with those norms, researchers 
today can read the court opinions and infer from them what lawyers in the 
past would have understood the words in those opinions to imply.  This 
approach is reasonable if researchers highlight uncertainty about particular 
coding choices, use multiple coders with legal training, and test for inter-
to be without merit.”).  In 2009, a sentence with such words appeared in 1,340 opinions of the New 
York state courts, as indicated by a Westlaw database (ny-orcs) search [remaining /s (“without merit” 
meritless) & da(2009)”] conducted on November 30, 2010. 
 13. R. Kirkland Cozine, The Emergence of Appellate Briefs in the Nineteenth-Century United 
States, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 482 (1994) (tracing rules and records concerning written appellate briefs 
in U.S. Supreme Court, Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, and New York’s highest court). 
 14. G. Edward White, The Appellate Opinion as Historical Source Material, 1 J. INTERDISC. 
HISTORY 1491 (1971). 
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coder agreement as to whether any particular implication of a precedent is 
plausibly necessary.15 
D. Plausible Alternative Reasoning 
Fourth, the researcher must determine whether the court majority in 
case y could have ruled for the same prevailing party without using 
reasoning that would contravene a necessary implication of precedent x. 
This criterion helps rule out cases in which the court majority did not 
refer to precedent x largely out of sympathy for the prevailing party or out 
of dislike or disgust for the losing party.  In explaining the content of a 
court opinion, rival explanations to stealth precedent erosion include 
sympathy or antipathy for a party to the lawsuit.  If the researcher can 
articulate plausible alternative reasoning that justifies ruling for the same 
party but does not change the scope of precedent x, it is less likely that the 
court majority failed to refer to precedent x only out of sympathy for the 
prevailing party in the case.   
This inference is stronger if the lawyers in case y had actually 
suggested the alternative reasoning to the court.  If not, the inference is, 
though weaker, still available, because, in practice, judges often do not limit 
their reasoning to what lawyers argue in their briefs.  Since researchers may 
vary as to what set of alternative reasons should count as plausible and 
consistent with precedent x, the best procedure is, again, to have multiple 
coders with legal training assess the plausibility of any particular alternative 
reasoning and test for inter-coder agreement. 
E. Departure From Judicial Commitments 
Fifth the researcher must decide whether the portion of the written 
opinion that erodes precedent x itself plausibly runs contrary to professed 
commitments of one or more of the judges in the court majority as to how 
to read legal texts or otherwise decide cases.  
Some judges profess that they are committed to certain approaches or 
techniques for deciding certain kinds of cases.16  Such commitments may 
range from a fully-articulated judicial “philosophy” to excluding certain 
ways of interpreting legal texts, such as reliance on legislative history.  The 
assumption here is that a judge’s professed commitments imply a subsidiary 
expectation to at least address (even if poorly by some quality measure) any 
 15. See Matthew Lombard et al., Content Analysis in Mass Communication: Assessment and 
Reporting of Intercoder Reliability, 28 HUM. COMM. RES. 587 (2002); Mousumi Banarjee et al., Beyond 
Kappa: A Review of Interrater Agreement Measures, 27 CANADIAN J. STAT. 3 (1999). 
 16. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2005); JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH (David M. O’Brien ed., 2d ed. 
2004). 
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disjunction between that commitment and the opinion that the judge writes 
or joins. 
To be sure, judges in a court may regularly depart from such professed 
commitments across the court opinions that they write or join.  If so, this 
criterion deserves far less weight than the others. Moreover, this criterion 
may not apply at all if one is not sure what the observable implications of a 
particular judicial commitment would be.  For example, while a 
commitment to privileging the “plain meaning” of statutory text implies 
some explicit parsing of statutory text, it is less clear how the text of a court 
opinion would reliably indicate judicial commitment to “pragmatism” or 
“minimalism.” 
F. Extrinsic Evidence 
Sixth, the researcher must look for extrinsic evidence that is consistent 
and inconsistent with judge desire to erode precedent x.  With court 
opinions alone, it is hard to isolate judges’ policy preferences from what 
those judges may sincerely believe legal texts or norms command in a 
particular case.  Accordingly, researchers rely on indirect measures of 
judicial policy preferences, including past voting behavior, political 
affiliation, speeches prior to judicial selection, and newspaper editors’ 
assessments at the time of judicial selection.17  Here, by contrast, one need 
not care whether the judge wants to erode the precedent because of policy 
views, political ideology, sympathy or disgust for particular classes of 
litigants, social peer effects, or even sincere views of what authoritative 
legal texts entail.  What matters is whether there is evidence of some reason 
for the judge to want to erode the precedent x. 
II.  
THE APPLICATION: RICCI V. DESTEFANO 
 This Part partially applies the method identified above to assess the 
claim that in Ricci v. DeStefano (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court issued a 
majority opinion that read Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
amended, in a way to erode by stealth United Steelworkers of America v. 
Weber (1979) and Johnson v. Transportation Agency (1987).   
The analysis is partial in two ways.  First, it assumes that the first 
criterion is satisfied, i.e., a stare decisis norm exists in the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  Second, with respect to criteria three and four, it does not make the 
 17. See Paul Brace et al., Measuring the Preferences of State Supreme Court Justices, 62 J. 
POLITICS 387, 390-92 (2000); Lee Epstein & Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 261, 263-66 (1996); see also LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A 
PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 173 (2006) (Supreme Court research literature has still not found 
“measures of the justices’ policy preferences that are independent of their behavior and highly valid”). 
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recommended checks for inter-rater reliability.  These caveats aside, I find, 
by applying the remaining criteria, a strong basis to conclude that the Ricci 
Court more likely than not wrote the majority opinion in that case to erode 
Weber and Johnson by stealth. 
A.  Background 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, declares certain 
kinds of conduct to be an “unlawful employment practice,” authorizes a 
private right of action, and establishes the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”), to which discrimination complaints must be filed 
before a lawsuit can proceed, and which itself may investigate charges of 
discrimination, initiate conciliation efforts, and bring suit against employers 
and others for violating the statute.18 
Section 703(a) of the Act contains two important provisions.  First, 
section 703(a)(1) provides that it is an “unlawful employment practice” for 
an employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”19 
Second, section 703(a)(2) provides that it is an "unlawful employment 
practice" for an employer to "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees . 
. . in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”20 
Since Griggs v. Duke Power Company (1971),21 the Court has read 
section 703(a)(2) to authorize “disparate impact” liability, i.e., to prohibit 
employer practices that make people of the same race or other protected 
characteristic much worse off than those without that characteristic, even if 
one cannot show that the employer engaged in that practice for that 
purpose.22  Such disparate impact, however, does not warrant Title VII 
relief where the challenged practice was “job related for the position in 
question and consistent with business necessity,” or the plaintiff shows, but 
the employer refuses to adopt, an equally valid but less discriminatory 
alternative employment practice.23 
 18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-4, 2000e-5 (2010). 
 19. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 20. § 2000e–2(a)(2). 
 21. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 22. For cases treating Griggs as a gloss on section 703(a)(2), see, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 
U.S. 440, 448-49 (1982).  In 1991, Congress added these concepts to the statutory text.  See 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2(k)(1)(A); Peter M. Leibold et al., Civil Rights Act of 1991: Race to the Finish-Civil Rights, 
Quotas, and Disparate Impact in 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 1043 (1993). 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A). 
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 In Ricci v. DeStefano (2009), more white test takers passed and scored 
higher on City of New Haven firefighter promotion exams than black and 
Hispanic test takers (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Exam Pass Rate and Promotion Eligibility by Race, 200324 
Race Pass Total Pass 
Rate 
Adverse Impact 
Ratio 
Promotion 
Lieutenant's Exam      
   Black 6 19 31.6% 0.54 0 
   Hispanic 3 15 20.0% 0.34 0 
   White 25 43 58.1% . 8 
   Total 34 77 44.2% . 8 
Captain's Exam      
   Black 3 8 37.5% 0.59 0 
   Hispanic 3 8 37.5% 0.59 0 to 2 
   White 16 25 64.0% . 5 to 7 
   Total 22 41 53.7% . 7 
 
When the New Haven Civil Service Board did not certify the exam 
results, some firefighters who had passed the test sued.  In this lawsuit, 
seventeen white firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter argued that by 
refusing to certify the test results, the City had committed race 
discrimination in violation of Title VII. 
The City justified that refusal on the ground that, given the statistical 
disparity in test results by race, city officials sincerely feared incurring Title 
VII disparate impact liability if they had certified those results.   On cross-
 
 24. Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 145.  Pass rate (= Pass/ Total) and Adverse Impact Ratio (= minority 
pass rate / White pass rate) are separately calculated.  Promotion refers to then-vacant positions only and 
ranges reflect the City’s Charter’s Rule of Three and reported rankings for Hispanic and blacks on both 
exams.  See id. at 145 nn.2-3.  There is an ambiguity about the white pass rate.  Elsewhere in its opinion, 
the district court reported the white pass rate for the lieutenant’s and captain’s exam as 60.5% and 88%, 
respectively.  See id. at 153, 154.  This implies that 26 (not 25) out of the 43 whites passed that exam 
(26/43=0.605) and that 22 (not 16) out of 25 whites passed that exam (22/25=0.88).  The district court 
has sealed the underlying exhibit upon which it relied to report the number of passing test-takers.  See 
Order Granting Motion to Seal Volume III, Volume VI and Exhibit 43 of Volume Exhibit 43 of Volume 
I, dated January 10, 2006, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 3:04-CV-1109 (D. Conn., entered Jan. 13, 2006) 
(Kravitz, J.) [Doc # 75].  Defendants’ submissions were also inconsistent on this point. Compare Ricci 
JA, infra note 172, at 223-26 (Marcano Aff. ¶¶ 17-19, 22-23, Nov. 2, 2005) (26 whites passed 
lieutenant’s exam and 18 whites passed captain’s exam); Defendants’ Local Rule 56(a) Statement ¶¶ 18-
23, Ricci v. DeStefano, No. 3:04-CV-1109 (D. Conn., filed Nov. 4, 2005) [Doc. # 53] (pass rates by race 
for each exam) with Ricci JA, infra note 172, at 218 (Marcano Aff., Oct. 27, 2005) (attached written 
summary of 2003 test results: 16 whites passed captain’s exam); id. at 25 (transcript of Jan. 2004 Civil 
Service Board proceeding) (same). 
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motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary 
judgment to the City, and the Second Circuit affirmed.25 
The Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, reversed.  The Court majority 
opinion was authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy and joined by Justices 
John Roberts, Antonin Scalia, Samuel Alito, and Clarence Thomas.  This 
Ricci majority declared that the plaintiffs were entitled to summary 
judgment that the City had violated section 703(a)(1) of Title VII.26  The 
Ricci majority reached this result in three steps. 
First, the Ricci majority concluded that, by refusing to certify the test 
results, the City necessarily violated section 703(a)(1).  The City had argued 
that since it had been solely motivated by the sincere desire to avoid Title 
VII disparate impact liability, it had not acted because of any plaintiff's race 
within the meaning of section 703(a).  However, the Ricci majority declared 
this starting premise: “The City's action would violate the disparate-
treatment prohibition of Title VII absent some valid defense.”27 
The Ricci majority then contrasted “the City's objective—avoiding 
disparate-impact liability" with “the City's conduct in the name of reaching 
that objective. . . . Whatever the City's ultimate aim-however well 
intentioned or benevolent it might have seemed-the City made its 
employment decision because of race.  The City rejected the test results 
solely because the higher scoring candidates were white.”28 
Second, the Ricci majority announced what it variously referred to as a 
“valid defense,” a “lawful justification,” and an “excuse[ ],” to such 
liability29 i.e., a “strong basis in evidence” to believe that, absent the City's 
refusal to certify the test results, the City would have been subject to Title 
VII disparate impact liability.30 
The Court borrowed this “strong basis in evidence" standard from its 
cases under the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause that, beginning 
with Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, had declared that to survive 
judicial scrutiny, the government had to show that there was a “strong basis 
in evidence” to believe that a government racial preference was necessary 
to remedy that government’s past discrimination.31  The Ricci majority read 
this standard into Title VII, reasoning that it was the proper way to “allow 
violations of [section 703(a)(1)] in the name of compliance with” Title 
 25. Ricci v. DeStefano, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Conn. 2006), aff’d, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008), 
reh’g denied, 530 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2008) (in banc). 
 26. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2673. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 2674. 
 29. Id. at 2673 (“valid defense”); id. at 2674 (“lawful justification”, “excuses”). 
 30. Id. at 2664, 2677. 
 31. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (plurality opinion); City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989).  See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2675. 
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VII’s disparate impact provisions “only in certain, narrow circumstances,” 
and thereby leaving “ample room for employers’ voluntary compliance 
efforts . . . . ; it is not so restrictive that it allows employers to act only when 
there is a provable, actual violation.”32 
Third, the Ricci majority concluded that, based on evidence in the 
record, the City so clearly could not satisfy the “strong basis” standard that, 
rather than remand for a trial, the plaintiffs were entitled to summary 
judgment.  The Ricci majority observed there was a “significant” adverse 
impact and that the plaintiffs did not dispute that the City had “a prima facie 
case of disparate impact liability.”33 
The Court concluded, however, that, on the summary judgment record, 
there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was a 
“strong basis in evidence” to believe that (1) the exams were not defensible 
as “job-related” and consistent with “business necessity”; or (2) “there 
existed an equally valid, less-discriminatory alternative that served the 
City's needs but that the City refused to adopt.”34  Having resolved the case 
this way, the Court declined to reach the plaintiffs’ argument that the City 
had also violated the Equal Protection Clause.35 
B.  Arguments From Weber and Johnson 
This section shows that although neither Weber nor Johnson are cited 
in the Ricci majority opinion, the parties’ legal briefs and the dissenting 
opinion made arguments that expressly relied on Weber or Johnson as 
precedent. 
In Weber, the Supreme Court concluded that an employer’s on-the-job 
training program did not violate sections 703(a) or 703(d) of Title VII by 
setting aside slots for black employees, because that program fell within the 
discretion afforded employers under Title VII to voluntarily adopt “plans 
designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally 
segregated job categories.”36  Johnson followed Weber to conclude that, 
under certain conditions, Title VII permitted a public employer to promote 
a qualified candidate based on sex pursuant to a voluntary affirmative 
action plan.37 
 32. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676. 
 33. Id. at 2677; see id. at 2678 (“Based on how the passing candidates ranked and an application 
of the ‘rule of three,’ certifying the examinations would have meant that the City could not have 
considered black candidates for any of the then-vacant lieutenant or captain positions.”). The Rule of 
Three refers to a New Haven City Charter section that provides that “promotions from the eligibility lists 
must be from among ‘those applicants with the three highest scores.’” Kelly v. City of New Haven, 881 
A.2d 978, 984 (Conn. 2005) (footnote omitted) (quoting New Haven Charter, art. XXX, § 160). 
 34. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678. 
 35. See id. at 2681. 
 36. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979). 
 37. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 627, 641-42 (1987). 
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In Ricci, the dissent and the parties expressly relied on Weber or 
Johnson as precedent. 
First, in her Ricci dissenting opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
(joined by Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, and Stephen Breyer) 
contrasted the Court's reasoning with Johnson: “[I]f the voluntary 
affirmative action at issue in Johnson does not discriminate within the 
meaning of Title VII, neither does an employer's reasonable effort to 
comply with the Title VII's disparate-impact provision by refraining from 
action of doubtful consistency with business necessity.”38  In response, the 
Ricci majority wrote nothing. 
 Second, both parties treated Weber and Johnson as precedent to be 
followed or distinguished in Ricci.  I identified, for the plaintiffs’ Title VII 
claim, all the Supreme Court cases involving Title VII that were cited in the 
parties’ briefs.  The parties cited ten such cases in common, including 
Weber and Johnson.  Of these ten cases, only four cases were used to argue 
from precedent concerning an issue in Ricci that the Court actually decided.  
These four cases included Weber and Johnson.39 
 The plaintiffs’ lawyers argued that Weber and Johnson did not justify 
the City’s refusal to certify the test results, because the City “expressly 
disclaimed acting to remedy past discrimination, and never claimed in the 
district court that it was acting ‘to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance’ in 
‘traditionally segregated job categories’,” and did not act “pursuant to a 
preexisting affirmative action plan.”40  They further argued that the “facts 
betray the city’s preference for ‘mere blind hiring by the numbers,’ a goal 
Johnson ‘emphatically did not authorize’.”41 
 The City’s lawyers also relied on Weber and Johnson.  They argued 
that Johnson’s holding confirmed that “promotion decisions can be shaped 
by the need to comply with Title VII itself,”42 and that “Johnson and Weber 
indicate that the constitutional ‘strong basis’ standard does not apply in the 
Title VII context and that Title VII sets a lower standard.”43  At the same 
time, they emphasized that Weber and Johnson involved voluntary 
“employer-initiated affirmative-action policies . . . that expressly sanctioned 
preferential hiring of minority and female employees,” whereas the City 
had “merely decline[d] to use employment tests in an effort to comply with 
Congress’s mandate in Title VII.”44  Finally, the City’s lawyers asserted 
 38. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2700 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 39. The other two cases were Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), and McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 40. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 61, Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328) (quoting 
Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09) (citations omitted). 
 41. Id. at 62 (quoting Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637). 
 42. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 17-18, Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328). 
 43. Id. at 20-21 (citations omitted). 
 44. Id. at 21 n.14. 
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that Johnson had rejected an argument “comparable” to the plaintiff’s view 
that the City’s refusal to certify the test results amounted to “direct 
evidence” of Title VII race discrimination, and that the City bore the burden 
of proving ot
In reply, the plaintiffs’ lawyers argued that neither Weber nor Johnson 
supported the City’s view that Title VII “requires less than the 
constitutional strong-basis-in-evidence standard.”  In those cases, they 
wrote, “employers acted to end manifest imbalances resulting from long 
histories of job-category segregation that raised strong inferences of past 
intentional discrimination.”  In contrast, the City could not and did not 
claim “such a manifest imbalance in” the ranks of the New Haven Fire 
Department.46 
Third, thirteen of the twenty-seven amicus briefs referred to either 
Weber or Johnson or both.47   Of these, six amicus briefs relied on either 
Weber or Johnson to argue that the City's refusal to certify the test results 
does not necessarily amount to race discrimination in violation of Title 
VII.48  In addition, an amicus brief, filed to support the plaintiffs, relied on 
 45. See id. at 26 n.17. 
 46. Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits at 17 n.14, Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (Nos. 07-1428, 08-
328). 
 47. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Pac. Legal Found. and the Ctr. for Coll. Affordability and 
Productivity in Support of Petitioners at 12-13; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Vacatur and Remand at 10, 12-14, 16; Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Police Orgs. as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 22; Amicus Brief of the Ctr. for Individual Rights, the Center for Equal 
Opportunity, and the Am. Civil Rights Inst. in Support of Petitioners at 20-23; Brief of Amicus Curiae 
NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc. in Support of Respondents at 26-30; Brief of Int'l Mun. 
Lawyers Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 34; Brief of the States of Maryland et 
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 17; Brief of the Soc'y of Human Res. Mgmt. as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12, 16; Brief of the Nat'l P'ship for Women & Families and the 
Nat'l Woman's Law Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6, 19; Brief of Am. Civil 
Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6; Brief for the New York Law Sch. 
Racial Justice Project as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 16; Brief of Amici Curiae Asian 
Am. Justice Ctr. et al. in Support of Respondents at 9, 29-31; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal 
Employment Advisory Council in Support of Respondents at 17, 19, Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (Nos. 07-
1428, 08-328). 
 48. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Vacatur and Remand at 14 & n.3 
(arguing that "this case involves no explicit racial classifications to make employment decisions," and 
adding: "[n]otably, this Court has upheld even explicit race- or gender-based classifications to remedy 
disparities in the workplace.") (citing to Weber and Johnson); Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal 
Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc. in Support of Respondents at 26 (arguing that City satisfies "the standard set 
forth in Johnson and Weber"); Brief of the Soc’y of Human Resource Mgmt. as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Respondents at 12 ("This case is indeed stronger than the voluntary remedial setting of 
Johnson . . . ."); Brief of the Nat’l P’ship for Women & Families and the Nat'l Woman's Law Ctr., et al. 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 19 (citing Weber in support of proposition that "requiring 
an employer to continue to use a selection device despite knowledge of its disparate impact – or, in the 
alternative, encouraging an employer to remain ignorant of its practices’ disparate impact . . . – would 
frustrate Title VII’s effort to undermine traditional patterns of segregation and hierarchy"); Brief of 
Amici Curiae Asian Am. Justice Ctr. et al. in Support of Respondents at 29 ("In fact, rather than 
practicing intentional discrimination [under Title VII], Respondents were actually complying with their 
affirmative obligation to avoid racial discrimination.")(citing Johnson); Brief Amicus Curiae of the 
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Weber and Johnson to support the view that even if the City refused to 
certify the test results to avoid disparate impact liability, they should be 
required to show more than a good-faith fear of such liability.49 
C.  Court’s Reasoning Contravenes Weber and Johnson  
  This section offers exegeses of Weber and Johnson to establish that 
the Ricci majority contravened several of what most lawyers at the time 
Ricci was decided would have agreed were plausibly necessary implications 
of Weber and Johnson.  The Ricci majority concluded that an employer’s 
refusal to certify the test results because of a statistical race disparity was 
sufficient to find a section 703(a)(1) violation, but the employer could assert 
the defense that it had a “strong basis in evidence” that, absent its action, it 
would be subject to Title VII disparate liability. 
This reasoning contravened four plausibly necessary implications of 
Weber and Johnson.  First, the Weber Court rejected the view that any 
employer consideration of race is sufficient to violate section 703(a)(1).  
Second, the Weber Court rejected the view that Title VII permits an 
employer to consider race only to remedy actual or arguable past 
discrimination by that employer.  Third, in Johnson, the Court rejected the 
argument that an employer may consider sex without violating section 
703(a)(1) only when it has a “strong basis” in evidence that doing so would 
remedy past employer conduct that violates Title VII.  Fourth, the Johnson 
Court rejected the argument that an employer that considers sex violates 
section 703(a)(1) unless it prevails on a “strong basis” defense. 
 Since these implications of Weber and Johnson were plausibly 
necessary when Ricci was decided, we should have expected the Ricci 
Court to at least address them expressly, if only to reject them.  The harder 
it is to read Weber and Johnson not to carry the implications identified here, 
the easier it is to infer that the Ricci Court deliberately, not inadvertently, 
kept silent as to those cases in order to erode them by stealth. 
1.  Background 
By the mid-1970s, three important features of federal employment law 
were in place.  First, in Griggs v. Duke Power Company (1971), the 
Supreme Court had read Title VII to include liability under a disparate-
impact theory.50  Second, because of Executive Order 11246, federal 
Equal Employment Advisory Council in Support of Respondents at 17 ("This Court also has afforded 
employers latitude under Title VII to address statistical disparities in the workplace through race- and 
gender-conscious measures.") (referring to Weber and Johnson), Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (Nos. 07-1428, 
08-328). 
 49. Amicus Brief of the Center for Individual Rights et al. in Support of Petitioners at 20, 22-23, 
Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328). 
 50. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
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agencies, often through the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC), 
were pushing firms receiving government contracts to increase minority 
representation in their workforces.51 
Third, after McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. (1976),52 
it was settled that Title VII imposed the same standards of liability in cases 
where white plaintiffs claimed employer race discrimination that applied in 
cases where the plaintiffs were black.  However, McDonald had expressly 
left open whether Title VII permitted employers to consider race in 
employment decisions pursuant to voluntary affirmative action plans. 
In McDonald, two white men sued their former employer, Santa Fe 
Trail Transportation Co., as well as their union, arguing that when Santa Fe 
had allegedly fired them for stealing cans of antifreeze, Santa Fe violated 
Title VII by not also firing Charles Jackson, a black employee that had also 
stolen those items.53   
Santa Fe’s lawyers argued, among other things, that Santa Fe had not 
violated Title VII even if “our local manager” had not fired Jackson, 
thinking “‘Jackson's black, all things considered, we’ll give him a break’.”54  
The reason:  Title VII should be read to permit discrimination favoring 
racial minorities “under special circumstances or in isolated cases which 
cannot reasonably be said to burden whites as a class unduly, may not be 
'invidious' and may be acceptable at this time in our history.”  If so, Title 
VII would preserve “reasonable ‘affirmative action’ programs . . . to 
remedy the wrongs of the past, and isolated cases like that at bar, in which a 
black man may have been given a ‘break’.”55 
In an opinion by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Supreme Court 
rejected this argument: “We . . . hold today that Title VII prohibits racial 
discrimination against the white petitioners in this case upon the same 
standards as would be applicable were they Negroes and Jackson white.”  
To this text, Marshall added a footnote in which he rejected any Title VII 
“exception” for “isolated cases,” and then added, “Santa Fe disclaims that 
the actions challenged here were any part of an affirmative action program, 
and we emphasize that we do not consider here the permissibility of such a 
program, whether judicially required or otherwise prompted.”56 
 51. See Bernard E. Anderson, The Ebb and Flow of Enforcing Executive Order 11246, 86 AM. 
ECON. REV. 298 (1996). 
 52. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
 53. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 276. 
 54. Brief of Respondent Santa Fe Trail Transportation Company at 16, McDonald, 427 U.S. 273 
(No. 75-260), 1976 WL 194110 at *16. 
 55. Id. at 20. 
 56. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 280 & n.8 (1976) (citations omitted). 
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Marshall's draft opinion, circulated on June 11, had contained a similar 
disclaimer.57  On June 14, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote to Marshall: 
“[W]e are kidding ourselves . . . to the entent [sic] that you disavow 
consideration of the validity of a voluntary affirmative action program.  I 
agree that a judicially required program would not be covered, but the 
reasoning in the text will surely support the typical reverse discrimination 
claim which any quota system will stimulate.”58  Both Justices Potter 
Stewart and Harry Blackmun also indicated that they shared this doubt as 
expressed in Stevens’ letter.59 
The next day, Marshall replied to Stevens’ concern: “[W]e agree that a 
judicially required affirmative action program, which is not the subject in 
this case, is not ruled out in my draft.  I cannot agree with you, however, 
that a program which a judge can lawfully require is necessarily illegal 
without a judge’s order.  If this were true, then, among other things, the 
conciliation goal of Title VII, and the EEOC’s role in implementing it, 
would be much deemphasized, if not ruled out, in many instances where 
they might otherwise be most valuable.”60  In emphasizing Title VII’s 
“conciliation” goal, Marshall was referring to section 706(b) of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, which provided that if the EEOC found “reasonable 
cause to believe that the charge [of a Title VII violation] is true, the 
Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful 
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and 
persuasion.”61 
2. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber (1979) 
 This section presents an exegesis of the Weber case.  It describes in 
detail the facts in the case (as stipulated and found), as well as the 
arguments made by lawyers and judges in the case.   It shows that, at the 
time Ricci was decided, most lawyers would have found it plausible that the 
Weber Court rejected the view that any employer consideration of race is 
 57.  “[W]e do not consider here the permissibility of employers' programs -- judicially required, or 
otherwise prompted -- to relieve the present effects of past racial discrimination; there is no indication 
that the actions challenged here were any part of such a program . . . .” Marshall Draft Opinion at 7-8 
(circulated June 11, 1976), Box 393, Folder 7, William J. Brennan Papers, Manuscript Division, Library 
of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
 58. Letter from John Paul Stevens to Thurgood Marshall (June 14, 1976), Box 171, Folder 13, 
Thurgood Marshall Papers (on file with Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
[hereinafter Marshall Papers]). 
 59. Letter from Potter Stewart to Thurgood Marshall (June 14, 1976), Box 171, Folder 13, 
Marshall Papers; Letter from Blackmun to Thurgood Marshall (June 17, 1976), Box 304, Folder 3719 
(on file with Potter Stewart Papers (MS 1367), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, New 
Haven, CT). 
 60. Letter from Thurgood Marshall to John Paul Stevens (June 15, 1976), Box 171, Folder 13, 
Marshall Papers.  
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). 
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sufficient to violate section 703(a)(1), as well as rejected the view that Title 
VII permits an employer to consider race only to remedy actual or arguable 
past discrimination by that employer. 
a. The District Court 
On December 31, 1974, Brian Weber filed a Title VII suit against his 
employer, the Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation, and his labor 
union, the United Steelworkers of America (“USW”).  Weber filed suit on 
behalf of himself, and he was later certified as the representative of a class 
of white Kaiser employees and USW members at Kaiser’s Gramercy, 
Louisiana plant who had applied, or were eligible to apply, for on-the-job 
training programs since February 1, 1974.62 
The underlying facts were largely undisputed.  Since 1968, Weber had 
been an employee at Kaiser’s plant in Gramercy, Louisiana, and a member 
of USW Local 5702.63  On February 1, 1974, Kaiser and USW had entered 
into a collective bargaining agreement that provided, in relevant part, that 
Kaiser and USW would “review the minority representation in the existing 
Trade, Craft and Assigned Maintenance classifications” in fifteen plants, 
including its plant in Gramercy, and, if necessary, “establish certain goals 
and time tables in order to achieve a desired minority ratio.”  In particular, 
“[a]s apprentice and craft jobs are to be filled, . . . at a minimum, not less 
than one minority employee will enter for every non-minority employee 
entering until the goal is reached unless at a particular time there are 
insufficient available qualified minority candidates.”64 
Before the 1974 agreement, “substantially all maintenance and craft 
personnel employed at Kaiser’s Gramercy Works were obtained by hire of 
persons qualified and trained in such crafts prior to employment at Kaiser.”  
Moreover, “[t]he available supply of trained craft and trade personnel 
available for hire by [Kaiser] as new employees” had been, and remained, 
“almost entirely made up of white males.”65  In 1972 and 1973, black craft 
employees at the Gramercy plant were less than two percent of the total 
number of craft employees. 66 
Between 1964 and February 1974, Kaiser had conducted two programs 
for on-the-job training for certain craft positions at the Gramercy plant.  
First, Kaiser ran an on-the-job training program “in the ‘Carpenter-Painter’ 
craft category” from 1964 until 1971.  To be eligible, Kaiser employees had 
to be “physically qualified” and have at least “one year experience in this 
 62. Appendix at 9-15 (Complaint), Weber, 443 U.S. 193, (Nos. 78-432, 78-435 and 78-436) 
(hereinafter “Weber App.”); Weber App. 24 (class certification order, dated March 19, 1975). 
 63. Id. at 124 (Stipulation ¶ 2). 
 64. Id. at 125 (Stipulation ¶ 4). 
 65. Id. at 125-26 (Stipulation ¶ 5). 
 66. Id. at 167 (Kaiser Exhibit 3). 
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category.”  During this program, “11 employees entered this craft line, two 
of whom were black.”67   
Second, Kaiser ran an on-the-job training program in the “General 
Repairman” craft category from 1968 until 1971.  For this program, Kaiser 
employees had to be “physically qualified” and have at least “three years’ 
experience in this category.”  In 1971, Kaiser switched to a two year prior-
experience minimum.  “In this program, 13 trainees entered this line in 
1969, 3 trainees entered the line in 1970, and one trainee entered the line in 
1971.”  All of them were white. 68 
 In 1974, and pursuant to its 1974 labor agreement, Kaiser posted bids 
for a new on-the-job training program for trainees in six craft categories.  
Unlike the past training programs, this program did not require prior 
experience in the craft, but did provide that “at least half of the persons 
selected, for such training, would be members of minority groups.”69  In 
total, six white and seven black employees were selected.70 
Every black employee that occupied a craft training slot was junior in 
seniority to the one or more white bidders who had unsuccessfully bid for 
that slot,71 including Brian Weber “and/or other members of the class” he 
represented.72 
 In 1976, after a bench trial, the district court found that the race set-
asides in the 1974 training programs at Kaiser’s Gramercy plant 
discriminated against Weber and the other plaintiff class members because 
of race in violation of Title VII, sections 703(a) and (d).73  The court 
permanently enjoined Kaiser and USW “from denying Mr. Weber and the 
other members of the class access to on-the-job training programs on the 
basis of race.”74  The court found, among other things, “no evidence that 
Kaiser, in incorporating this quota system in the 1974 Labor Agreement, 
did so with a view toward correcting the effects of prior discrimination at 
any of the fifteen plants to which the system had application. To the 
contrary, it appears that satisfying the requirements of OFCC, and avoiding 
vexatious litigation by minority employees, were its prime motivations.”75 
That court also found that the evidence at trial “sub judice established that 
the black employees being preferred over more senior white employees had 
 67. Id. at 126 (Stipulation ¶ 5). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 127 (Stipulation ¶ 6). 
 70. Id. at 127-28 (Stipulation ¶ 6),. 
 71. Id. at 128 (Stipulation ¶ 6). 
 72. Id. (Stipulation ¶ 7). 
 73. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 769 (E.D. La. 1976). 
 74. Id. at 770. 
 75. Id. at 765. 
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never themselves been the subject of any unlawful discrimination during 
hiring.”76 
b. The Fifth Circuit 
 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, USW’s lawyers argued that Title VII 
permitted the race preferences in the 1974 Kaiser training programs, 
because where companies and unions are aware of conditions that arguably 
violate Title VII, Title VII permits them to voluntarily adopt solutions, such 
as racial preferences, that a court could order as remedies upon finding an 
actual Title VII violation: “[I]f the evidence suggests that a plaintiff could 
establish a prima facie case and that the defendants do not have an 
obviously convincing rebuttal, then they should be permitted to confer 
remedial priorities as a court would were it to adjudicate the case and find 
unlawful behavior.”77 
 This approach was justified, USW’s lawyers argued, because voluntary 
compliance with Title VII could not happen “if employers and unions are 
paralyzed absent total certain[t]y that their prior actions were unlawful.”  
First, while it was “rarely possible” to predict litigation outcomes “with 
absolute certainty, . . . changing legal tides make predictions under Title VII 
more hazardous than in other fields.”78 
Second, even with absolute certainty of a Title VII violation, 
employers and unions “would be unlikely to want to proclaim their own 
guilt,” lest such an admission “automatically entitle[ ] employees to recover 
backpay for past sins.”79 
Third, EEOC conciliation authority confirmed that Congress had not 
intended to make “absolute certainty as to prior illegality” a necessary 
condition for “voluntary provision of remedial priorities.”80  In section 
706(b), Congress required that when the EEOC had “reasonable cause to 
believe” that a discrimination charge was “true,” it had to try to eliminate 
the allegedly discriminatory practice “by informal methods of conference, 
conciliation, and persuasion.”81  USW’s lawyers argued that such 
“reasonable cause to believe” also sufficed to authorize, through EEOC 
 
 76. Id. at 769. 
 77. Brief for Defendant-Appellant United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO at 19-20, Weber v. 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1980) (No. 76-3266).  The Fifth Circuit 
appellate briefs in Weber were obtained from the National Archives, Southwest Region, Fort Worth, TX. 
 78. Id. at 16. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 17. 
 81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). 
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conciliation, voluntary adoption of “remedial priorities which the parties 
believe—rightly or wrongly—are required to cure past discrimination.”82 
 With this reading of the statute, USW’s lawyers then pointed to three 
facts as showing a “prima facie case” of Title VII disparate impact liability 
against Kaiser for how it filled “training vacancies prior to 1974.”83  When 
Kaiser and USW negotiated the 1974 agreement, they knew that “the 
percentage of blacks in craft jobs in the Gramercy plant was substantially 
below the percentage of blacks in the plant workforce and in the 
community.”84 
They also knew that only two black workers had been admitted to 
Kaiser’s pre-1974 training programs.85  By insisting on a prior-experience 
requirement for admission to its pre-1974 craft training programs, Kaiser 
had “disproportionately disqualif[ied] black employees as compared to 
whites, because blacks—unlike whites—had been unable to secure the 
relevant prior experience due to their exclusion from the building trades 
industry.”86 
Moreover, although Kaiser could argue that the prior-experience 
requirement was a “business necessity,” it was “impossible to calculate” 
whether that defense to Title VII disparate impact liability would succeed in 
this case.87  In addition, to prevail on that defense, USW’s lawyers 
suggested, Kaiser would have had to persuade a court that “it was 
impossible for any employee to master its training program without prior 
experience” and that business necessity also “justified its not instituting 
changes in the training program prior to 1974, as it did in 1974.”88  To be 
sure, Kaiser had “greatly enlarged the scope of the training program, at 
great cost, when it eliminated the prior experience requirement,” but that 
did “not necessarily prove that [it] lacked a ‘business necessity’ defense to 
installing that program earlier.”89 
 Given such arguable Title VII liability, USW’s lawyers explained, 
Title VII permitted Kaiser to “accord priority access to training employees” 
at least to “all blacks hired before February 1, 1974—the date [Kaiser] 
eliminated the prior experience requirement,” because they had all arguably 
 
 82. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 77, at 17-18 (footnote omitted).  At the same time, 
they added, it would a mistake to make an EEOC “reasonable cause” finding the predicate for voluntary 
remedial efforts, because employers would have to wait for months or years for the EEOC before taking 
“self-corrective action.” Id. at 18. Nor did Congress intend for voluntary compliance to depend on 
EEOC conciliation.  See id. at 19. 
 83. Id. at 22. 
 84. Id. at 21. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 21-22. 
 87. Id. at 23. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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suffered the discriminatory effect of that prior experience requirement.90  
This voluntarily-adopted racial preference was what a court would have 
ordered in any event, because in the Fifth Circuit, when a court found 
“discriminatory exclusion of an affected class from a desirable job,” the 
“traditional remedy” was to “grant the class members ‘the first opportunity 
to move into the next vacancies which they would have occupied but for 
wrongful discrimination and which they are qualified to fill.’”91  As it 
happened, because the trainee vacancies reserved for blacks under the 1974 
training programs had been awarded in order of their seniority, all the black 
employees that had received training slots were thus far “pre-1974 
employees.”92 
 Kaiser's lawyers, in contrast, primarily argued that the training set-
asides for black employees were part of an effort to comply with the 
regulations set forth under Executive Order 11246, and therefore consistent 
with past cases that found that valid affirmative action plans under such 
regulations did not violate Title VII.93   The United States and the EEOC 
(“the Government”) also spent most of its brief on a similar argument about 
EO 11246,94 though largely in a footnote, it also endorsed USW’s view.95 
Brian Weber’s lawyer, however, argued that any employer racial 
preference violated sections 703(a) and (d) of Title VII.96  In so doing, he 
criticized the USW’s arguable-violation argument.  Among other things, the 
prior-experience requirement was “job related” and a “business necessity,” 
because evidence at trial showed that “each year of prior experience 
eliminated the need for a year of training at a cost to Kaiser of $15,000 to 
$20,000 a year.”97  Furthermore, the evidence in the record did not establish 
that the prior experience requirement caused a disparate impact, because the 
 90. Id. at 26. 
 91. Id. (quoting United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 927 (5th Cir. 1973)) 
 92. Id. at 27.  To be sure, USW’s lawyers admitted, at some point in the future, all the pre-1974 
black employees who want them will have filled training vacancies, making it possible that the 1974 
agreement might award preferences to black employees hired on or after Kaiser eliminated the prior-
experience requirement, i.e. not “identifiable victims of discrimination.”  At that point, however, the 
case law would likely be clear as to whether Title VII “tolerates voluntarily-adopted benevolent quotas 
favoring non-discriminatee minority employees.”  But since only pre-1974 black employees had 
benefited from the racial set-asides, they argued, the Fifth Circuit need not resolve that question. Id. at 
28. 
 93. See Original Brief on Behalf of Defendant-Appellant Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. at 17-
43, Weber, 563 F.2d 216 (No. 76-3266). 
 94. See Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as 
Amicus Curiae at 16-34, Weber, 563 F.2d 216 (No. 76-3266). 
 95. Id. at 37 n.19. 
 96. Brief of Appellees at 16-27, Weber, 563 F.2d 216 (No. 76-3266). 
 97. Id. at 38 (footnote omitted).  At trial, Dennis English, Kaiser’s industrial relations 
superintendent, had testified that for Kaiser’s 1974 training program, on an “annual basis, the minimum 
cost is between 15 and $20,000.00 per trainee.”  Weber App., supra note 62, at 68 (Trial Tr. 63). 
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USW did not account for the confounding disparate impact of Kaiser’s 
seniority system.98 
 In addition, one amicus, the Southeastern Legal Foundation, disputed 
that voluntary efforts to remedy arguable Title VII violations were justified 
by case law permitting courts to order race-based remedies for actual Title 
VII violations.  The amicus likened this reasoning to “a rationalization that 
could be advanced by the organizers of a lynching party: ‘Since courts can 
impose capital punishment, and since they are certain to do so in the case of 
this particular murderer, why should we wait for the law?  Why can’t we 
‘string him up’ right now?  After all, we know he’s guilty!’”99 
 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that Kaiser’s 
plan violated sections 703(a) and 703(d).  While Title VII permitted a court 
to require race preferences as part of a remedy for actual past 
discrimination, under the circumstances, Kaiser’s race-based ratio for 
training program eligibility “could not be approved even had it been 
judicially imposed.”100  Absent “prior discrimination a racial quota loses its 
character as an equitable remedy and must be banned as an unlawful racial 
preference prohibited by Title VII, § 703(a) and (d).”101 
In so ruling, the Fifth Circuit quickly dismissed arguments about the 
prior-experience requirement for Kaiser’s past training program: Its pre-
1974 training program—only 28 trainees over ten years—“was so limited in 
scope that the prior craft experience requirement cannot be characterized as 
an unlawful employment practice, especially when Kaiser was actively 
recruiting blacks to its craft families during the same period.”102 
The Fifth Circuit also refused to conclude that Kaiser had 
discriminated in the hiring of craft workers: “That only three black crafts 
workers were hired from outside the plant reflects the general lack of skills 
among available blacks but does not reflect any unlawful practice by 
Kaiser.”103  It also disagreed that Kaiser’s challenged practice was a remedy 
for societal discrimination, or that it could be upheld because of Executive 
Order 11246 even absent past hiring or promotion discrimination.104 
 
 98. Brief of Appellees, supra note 96, at 38-39.  Title VII's disparate impact liability does not 
apply to the operation of a “bona fide seniority or merit system,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).  See Lorance 
v. AT&T Techs., 490 U.S. 900, 904 (1989); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 350-55 
(1977). 
 99. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Southeastern Legal Foundation at 36, Weber, 563 F.2d 216 (No. 
76-3266). 
 100. Weber, 563 F.2d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 224 n.13. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id. at 225-27. 
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In dissent, Judge John Minor Wisdom endorsed the arguable-violation 
argument.105  He identified three arguable violations of Title VII that 
Kaiser’s 1974 training program could reasonably remedy.  First, only 14.8 
percent of Kaiser’s employees were black in 1974, as compared to an area 
workforce that was 39 percent, raising the possibility that Kaiser “had 
determined qualifications through nonvalidated tests or impermissibly 
subjective processes.”106  Absent such arguable discrimination against 
blacks for unskilled jobs, “more blacks could have entered a training 
program based solely on seniority.”107 
Second, the prior experience requirement in place before 1974 
arguably violated Title VII, because “[o]nly two of 28 employees trained 
under that program were black.”108  Business necessity would not have 
justified this disparity, despite “evidence that each year of a worker’s 
experiences saved the company money,” because “no effort was made to 
present contrary evidence,” and because expense and convenience did not 
justify using “a criterion with divergent impact.”109  Nor was this training 
program “too limited in scope” to violate Title VII: “If past experience does 
not satisfy the business necessity requirement, and if more whites than 
blacks had past experience, then a serious question of Title VII liability is 
raised even if only one position is at stake.”110 
Third, requiring any training for some craft jobs may violate Title VII.  
This claim, though “most easily refuted” by the employer, would still 
require rebuttal, because of the “extremely narrow scope” of the business-
necessity defense.111 
c. U.S. Supreme Court 
In December 1978, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.112  In 
their briefs before the Supreme Court, the Government now offered a 
variant of an arguable-violation argument, except that it emphasized 
 105. See id. at 230-34.  Judge Wisdom also concluded that the plan should be upheld as a 
reasonable response to societal discrimination against blacks in craft occupations, see id. at 234-36, or 
could be upheld if required by regulations under Executive Order 11246, which Congress had ratified as 
permitted by Title VII when it amended Title VII in 1972, see id. at 236-38. 
 106. Id. at 231 (footnotes omitted). 
 107. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 231-32. 
 110. Id. at 232. 
 111. Id. 
 112. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 439 U.S. 1045 (1978).  Although Kaiser and USW 
had sought rehearing in the Fifth Circuit, their petitions were denied.  Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & 
Chem. Corp., 571 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1978).  Despite his dissent, Judge Wisdom opposed rehearing en 
banc, because it would result in a nine month to one year delay in a case that was likely to go to the 
Supreme Court.  See JOEL WILLIAM FRIEDMAN, CHAMPION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: JUDGE JOHN MINOR 
WISDOM 327-28 (2009). 
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Kaiser’s arguable Title VII violation for hiring for craft positions only those 
job applicants with at least five years of prior experience.113  On this view, 
since Kaiser had used a “racial classification” to select employees to fill 
training slots, Weber had made a “prima facie showing” of section 703(a) 
and (d) violations.  However, because that “race-conscious selection 
device” had been properly used “for remedial purposes,” the prima facie 
case was rebutted.114 
In contrast, in a bid to win the vote of Justice Potter Stewart,115 the 
USW abandoned its arguable-violations approach, arguing instead, based 
on Title VII’s legislative history, that Congress’ silence in Title VII on 
voluntary affirmative action was in accord with its intent to preserve 
management autonomy, which included letting management and unions 
adopt voluntary affirmative action plans.116   
This argument implied, however, that section 703(j) of Title VII117 was 
intended to bar government-required affirmative action, including court-
ordered racial quotas.118  USW now expressly argued against the 
Government’s (and its former) arguable violation theory as resting on the 
premise that courts could “order quotas as remedies in Title VII cases.”119  
That premise was “flawed,” because “[f]loor leaders and principal 
supporters of Title VII in both Houses assured their fellow members in 
unambiguous terms that under no circumstances would Title VII empower 
courts to direct defendants to adopt racial quotas, even in cases where 
discrimination in violation of the Act is proved.”120 
By a 5-2 vote, the Supreme Court reversed.121  Writing for the 
majority, Justice William Brennan called “the Kaiser-USWA plan . . . an 
 113. Weber App., supra note 62, at 70 (Trial Tr. 67) (testimony of Dennis English: “We used to 
require a five years’ experience factor for hire into the journeymen, top-paying, standard rate craftsman 
classification. . . . [T]hat requirement was a requirement to be hired from outside the plant, not a training 
program requirement.”); and Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission at 42-54 (arguing that Kaiser race preference for 1974 training program was a reasonable 
remedy for the arguable violation caused by the effect of this five-year experience requirement), Weber, 
443 U.S. 193 (Nos. 78-432, 78-435, 78-436), 1979 WL 199725 at *42-54. 
 114. Brief for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 21, Weber, 
443 U.S. 193 (Nos. 78-432, 78-435, 78-436), 1979 WL 199725 at *21. 
 115. Malamud, supra note 3, at 211-12 (citing interview with Michael H. Gottesman); JUDITH 
STEIN, RUNNING STEEL, RUNNING AMERICA: RACE, ECONOMIC POLICY, AND THE DECLINE OF 
LIBERALISM 189 & 362 n.7 (1998) (citing 1994 interview with Michael Gottesman). 
 116. Brief for Petitioner United Steelworkers of America at 15-21, Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (Nos. 78-
432, 78-435, 78-436), 1979 WL 199720 at *15-21. 
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j). 
 118. Brief for Petitioner United Steelworkers of America, supra note 1 , at 15. 16
 119. Id. at 22. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Weber, 443 U.S. 193.  Justices Stevens and Powell did not participate.  Years later, Stevens 
told a law school audience that he “would have joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent in the Weber case.”  
John Paul Stevens, Learning On the Job, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1561, 1565 (2006). 
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affirmative action voluntarily adopted by private parties to eliminate 
traditional patterns of racial segregation.”  Brian Weber had erred by 
relying on “a literal construction of §§ 703(a) and (d) and upon McDonald 
[v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.]”122  Rather, starting with the statement in 
Holy Trinity Church v. United States (1892) that a “thing may be within the 
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its 
spirit nor within the intention of its makers,” the Weber Court discussed the 
Title VII legislative history as evidence of congressional intent t
 plans.123 
The Weber Court ultimately concluded: “We therefore hold that Title 
VII’s prohibition in §§ 703(a) and (d) against racial discrimination does not 
condemn all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plans.”124 
Title VII permitted Kaiser’s plan for the Gramercy plant, because it fell 
“within the area of discretion left by Title VII to the private sector 
voluntarily to adopt affirmative action plans designed to eliminate 
conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.”125  
It was therefore unnecessary to consider “petitioner’s argument that their 
plan was justified because they feared that black employees would bring 
suit under Title VII if they did not adopt an affirmative action plan.”126  In 
an earlier passage, that Court similarly noted that it did not intend to 
“suggest that the freedom of an employer to undertake race-conscious 
affirmative action efforts depends on w
ear of liability under Title VII.”127 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harry Blackmun underscored how the 
Court had read Title VII to permit employers, under certain circumstances, 
to consider race without proving that they had arguably violated Title VII in 
the past.128  Rather, the Court had read Title VII to permit an employer to 
 122. Weber, 443 U.S. at 201. 
 123. See id. at 202-08. 
 124. Id. at 208. 
 125. Id. at 209.  The Court so concluded after observing that the plan was designed to “open 
employment opportunities to Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them”; did 
not “unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees,” as white workers would not be fired 
and replaced with “new black hirees”; did not “create an absolute bar to the advancement of white 
employees”; and that the racial preference at the Gramercy plant would expire “as soon as the 
percentage of black skilled craftworkers in the Gramercy plant approximates the percentage of blacks in 
the local labor force.”  Id. at 208-09 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 126. Id. at 209 n.9. 
 127. Id. at 208 n.8. 
 128. Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  Based on similarity in language, including some 
verbatim sentences, Blackmun appears to have borrowed portions of the text of Part II of this 
concurrence from a May 14, 1979 memorandum by his law clerk, Lewis Mumford.  Mumford 
championed the arguable-violations theory, but in his May 14 memo, he presented three reasons to 
justify departing from that theory in favor of joining Brennan's opinion.  See Memorandum from LTM 
To HAB re: Weber, May 14, 1979, at page 7-8, Box 294, Folder 1, Blackmun Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
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consider race for affirmative action “solely in terms of a statistical disparity. 
The individual employer need not have engaged in discriminatory practices 
in the past. While, under Title VII, a mere disparity may provide the basis 
for a prima facie case against an employer, it would not conclusively prove 
a violation of the Act.”129  Moreover, under the Court’s reading, Title VII 
permitted “an employer to redress discrimination that lies wholly outside 
the bounds of Title VII,” thereby preventing Title VII from becoming “a 
means of ‘locking in’ th
ides no remedy.”130 
The Weber decision was controversial.  Among other responses, in 
July 1979, Utah Republican Senator Orrin Hatch introduced a two-page bill 
to amend sections 703(a) and 703(d) of Title VII—the provisions at issue in 
Weber—to “restate, with greater emphasis, the intent of Congress.”  The 
bill added, at the end of section 703(a)(2), the phrase “and we mean it this 
time.”  And after section 703(d), Hatch’s bill added: “The language of this 
subsection is designed to accurately and faithfully reflect the spirit in which 
Congress acts in approving it.”131  This was an apparent jab at the Weber 
Court’s quotation
 its “spirit.” 
More importantly, when Ronald Reagan became President, his lawyers 
identified Weber as precedent to attack as part of general litigation strategy, 
including legal arguments to the Supreme Court.132  In December 1981, 
some newspapers quoted assistant attorney general for civil rights William 
Bradford Reynolds as saying that Weber had been “wrongly decided” and 
the Supreme Court should “take another look at it.”133  Later that month, 
when President Reagan answered a reporter’s question in a way that 
appeared to suggest that he favored voluntary affirmative action by private 
industry, White House assistant counsel Michael Luttig, in helping draft a 
 129. Weber, 443 U.S. at 213 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
 130. Id. at 214-15 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 131.  S. 1469, 96th Cong. (1979).  See Orrin Hatch, The Son of Separate But Equal: The Supreme 
Court and Affirmative Action, in A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL REFORM 72 (Patrick B. McGuigan & 
Randall R. Rader eds., 1981) (writing that he was “moved” by the Weber decision to introduce this bill). 
 132. See RAYMOND WOLTERS, RIGHT TURN: WILLIAM BRADFORD REYNOLDS, THE REAGAN 
ADMINISTRATION, AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS 208-86 (1996). 
 133. Robert Pear, U.S. Panel Report Backs Hiring Goals: Civil Rights View Differs From White 
House on Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1981, at A21; Robert E. Taylor, Civil Rights Division 
Head Will Seek Supreme Court Ban on Affirmative Action, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1981, at 4.  But see 
William Bradford Reynolds, They Use Discrimination to Cure Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 
1983, at E4 (interview excerpts) ("Q. You were quoted as saying that the Supreme Court wrongly 
decided the Weber case . . . . A. I never said that.  What I said, in response to a question, was that I didn't 
think that the decision in the Weber case would apply in a public employment situation."). 
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mischievous because established quota + thus not effort to broaden 
recruitment effort.”134 
This section has presented an exegesis of the Weber case to show two 
plausibly necessary implications of the Weber case.  First, the Weber Court 
rejected the starting premise of the Ricci opinion, i.e., any employer 
consideration of race is sufficient to violate section 703(a)(1).  This view, 
argued by Brian Weber, who had sued under section 703(a) as well as 
section 703(d), was directly rejected by the Weber Court. 
Second, the Weber Court rejected the apparent Ricci Court view that 
Title VII permits an employer to consider race only to remedy actual or 
arguable past Title VII discrimination by that employer.  At various times in 
the Weber litigation, the lawyers for Kaiser, USW, and the Government, as 
well as Judge Wisdom, asserted variants of the arguable-violation approach 
to justify Kaiser’s race set-asides for its 1974 on-the-job training program.  
Yet, as the Weber majority opinion and Justice Blackmun’s 
concurrence make clear, the Weber Court did not restrict employer 
affirmative action plans only to circumstances where the plan aims to 
remedy that employer’s past actual or arguable Title VII disparate impact 
violations.  Rather, it read Title VII to permit employer plans to address a 
“conspicuous imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories” without 
regard to whether the employer’s past practices generated actual or arguable 
Title VII liability for that imbalance. 
3.  Johnson v. Transportation Agency (1987) 
 This section presents an exegesis of the Johnson case.  It shows that 
the Supreme Court in Johnson plausibly (1) rejected the view that Title VII 
permits an employer to consider race or sex pursuant to an affirmative 
action plan only where is it has a “strong” basis to believe that the plan is 
necessary to remedy past discrimination by that employer, and (2) rejected 
the view that an employer may justify the validity of an affirmative action 
plan only as a defense to section 703(a)(1) liability. 
a. The District Court 
In 1981, Paul Johnson sued his employer, the Santa Clara County 
Transportation Agency (“Agency”) for denying him a promotion because of 
his sex in violation of Title VII, section 703(a).135  After a bench trial, the 
district court found as follows: Johnson and eight other Agency employees, 
including Diane Joyce, had applied for the position of road dispatcher.  
 
 134. Handwritten notes, Files of Michael Luttig, OA 10021, Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, 
CA. 
 135. Joint Appendix at 3 (Complaint), Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (No. 85-1129), LEXSEE 1985 U.S. 
Briefs 1129 at *3. 
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After examination before a two-person “oral board,” seven of the nine 
applicants scored 70 and above, including Johnson (score: 75) and Joyce 
(score: 72.5), making those seven eligible for the road dispatcher position 
under merit system rules.136  A second oral board interviewed the seven 
eligible applicants, and unanimously recommended Johnson to fill the road 
dispatcher position.137  Based upon the examination results and the 
departmental interview, the district court found that Johnson was more 
qualified for the position of road dispatcher than Joyce.138 
The Agency Director promoted Joyce,139 because she was a woman 
and Johnson was a man.140  The rationale for promoting Joyce was the 
Agency’s affirmative action plan, dated December 18, 1978, which was in 
effect on the date of Joyce’s promotion.141  That plan had “no end date or 
other provision which would have had the effect of ending preferential 
treatment to women.”142  The Agency had not discriminated and did not 
discriminate “against women in regard to employment opportunities in 
general and promotions in par  
b. The Ninth Circuit 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment, 
concluding that the Agency’s affirmative action plan satisfied the 
conditions in Weber for when such plans would not violate Title VII, 
sections 703(a) and (d), and that the district court had read Weber too 
narrowly by reading it to require affirmative action plans to have a specific 
end date.144  In a partial dissent, Judge Wallace argued, among other things, 
that the validity of affirmative action plans should be analyzed as a separate 
affirmative defense to Title VII liability.145 
 136. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, No. C-81-1218-WAI, 1982 WL 31006 (N.D. Calif., Aug. 10, 
1982) (Findings of Fact ¶¶ 8-9). 
 137. Id. (Findings of Fact ¶ 10). 
 138. Id. (Findings of Fact ¶ 18). 
 139. Id.  (Findings of Fact ¶ 15). 
 140. “But for [Johnson’s] sex, male,” he would have been promoted to the road dispatcher position. 
Id. (Findings of Fact ¶ 18).  Had she not been a woman, Joyce would not have been promoted to that 
position. Id. (Findings of Fact ¶ 19). Joyce's sex, female, was “the substantial determining factor in her 
appointment to the position of Road Dispatcher.” Id. (Findings of Fact ¶ 21). 
 141. Id. (Findings of Fact ¶ 23). 
 142. Id. (Findings of Fact ¶ 24). 
 143. Id. (Findings of Fact ¶ 22).  The court further explained that, on the face of either the 
Agency’s December 1978 affirmative action, or the October 1979 affirmative action plan of Santa Clara 
County, nothing “tends to show” that the Agency’s plan “was prompted by concededly discriminatory 
practices committed in the past by the County or the Agency as distinguished from generally prevalent 
societal attitudes.”  Id. 
 144. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 770 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 145. Id. at 762 (Wallace, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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c. The U.S. Supreme Court 
In July 1986, the Supreme Court granted Johnson’s petition to hear the 
case.146  Over a month earlier, the Supreme Court had decided Wygant v. 
Jackson Board of Education (1986).147  In Wygant, white school teachers 
had sued a school board under, among other things, the Equal Protection 
Clause, to challenge a provision in their collective bargaining agreement: In 
case of layoffs, the teachers would be laid off in order of reverse seniority, 
“except that at no time will there be a greater percentage of minority 
personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority personnel 
employed at the time of the layoff.”148 
Deciding that the provision amounted to a racial classification, a four-
Justice plurality opinion declared that, to survive, the provision must be 
“supported by a compelling state purpose” and “the means chosen to 
accomplish that purpose” must be “narrowly tailored.”149  Moreover, where 
the asserted purpose is to remedy past discrimination, the district court must 
find “the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that 
remedial action was necessary”; otherwise, “an appellate court reviewing a 
challenge by nonminority employees to remedial action cannot determine 
whether the race-based action is justified as a remedy for prior 
discrimination.”150 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor observed: 
“[P]ublic employers are trapped between the competing hazards of liability 
to minorities if affirmative action is not taken to remedy apparent 
employment discrimination and liability to nonminorities if affirmative 
action is taken.”151  She, however, agreed with the plurality opinion that, 
when challenged, the district court must find that the public employer had 
“a firm basis for determining that affirmative action is warranted.”152 
The opinions in Wygant influenced how the parties in Johnson litigated 
before the Supreme Court.  Both Johnson’s lawyers and the Solicitor 
General’s Office (“SG”) argued that although Johnson only sued under 
Title VII, since the Agency was a public employer, the Court had to read 
 146. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 478 U.S. 1019 (1986) (dated July 7, 1986).  Justice Brennan had 
recommended denying the petition.  See Memorandum from Brennan to the Conference, July 1, 1986, 
Box 445, Folder 3, Blackmun Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
 147. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (decided May 19, 1986). 
 148. Id. at 270 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The agreement defined “minority group 
personnel” as “those employees who are Black, American Indian, Oriental, or of Spanish descendancy.”  
Id. at 271 n.2. 
 149. Id. at 274; see also id. at 285-86 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 150. Id. at 278 (emphasis added). 
 151. Id. at 291. 
 152. Id. at 292. 
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Title VII not as Weber did, but to conform to the Equal Protection Clause 
analysis applied in Wygant.153 
The SG also argued that, under Title VII, an employer’s voluntary 
affirmative action plan must be aimed to remedy that employer’s past 
discrimination.154  For how much proof showed a sufficient remedial 
purpose, the SG touted the Wygant rule: The employer must have “a strong 
basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.”155  
This rule best “resolved th[e] tension” between “an employer's 
understandable reluctance to concede guilt, opening him to liability for past 
discrimination against women or minorities, and . . . the emasculation of the 
remedial predicate, turning it into a mere matter of statistical balance after 
all.”156 
Moreover, the SG further argued that “the affirmative action plan in a 
Title VII lawsuit brought by a non-minority employee should be viewed as 
an affirmative defense.” Accordingly, the employer bore the burden of 
production and persuasion to show that its affirmative action plan “rested 
on a proper predicate of prior discrimination, and was narrowly tailored to 
address that problem.”  Absent enough basis “for concluding that 
discrimination has occurred--and thus no serious threat of litigation exists--
there are no competing demands to reconcile and no need for any settlement 
of discrimination charges, voluntary or otherwise.”157 
For its part, the Agency’s lawyers argued for the approach articulated 
in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Wygant: “The Court should now hold 
that when an employer has a firm basis for concluding that past 
discrimination may have occurred--such as awareness of evidence that 
would constitute a prima facie showing of a Title VII violation--it may 
adopt appropriate race or gender conscious remedial measures.”158 
On this record, they argued, such a firm basis existed.159  Although the 
district court had found no past discrimination by the Agency against 
women, that was irrelevant given “the pivotal issue here, i.e., whether there 
was sufficient evidence to support the Agency's conclusion that it may have 
 153. Petitioner’s Brief at 19-23, Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (No. 85-1129), 1986 WL 728150 at *19-23; 
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6-9, Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (No. 
85-1129), 1986 WL 728148 at *6-9. 
 154. Brief of the United States at 13, Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (No. 85-1129), 1986 WL 728148 at 
*13. 
 155. Id. at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 156. Id. (citation omitted). 
 157. Id. at 23. 
 158. Brief of Respondent at 18, Johnson, 480 U.S. 616 (No. 85-1129), 1986 WL 728165 at *18. 
 159. Among other things, they emphasized that out of 238 skilled craft employees, none were 
women; the Agency never had employed a woman road dispatcher; only one out of 110 road 
maintenance workers was a woman; and women comprised over 36% of the local area labor force and 
22% of the total Agency workforce.  Id. at 19. 
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discriminated against women in the past and that affirmative remedial 
action was warranted.” 160  As for the burden of proof, the Agency 
emphasized that under “well-established” doctrine, “[a]t all times the 
plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof.  The allocation of the burden 
does not change just because the case is brought in a ‘reverse 
discrimination’ context and involves a challenge to an affirmative action 
plan.”161 
The Supreme Court, by a 6-3 vote, affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision.  The Court opinion was authored by Justice Brennan and joined 
by four Justices, while Justice O’Connor wrote an opinion concurring in the 
judgment. 
First, the Court placed the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff.  Under 
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting doctrine, the employer could point to 
the existence of a valid affirmative action plan to satisfy its burden of 
producing a legitimate non-discriminatory reason.162  To be sure, the 
employer “will generally seek to avoid a charge of pretext by presenting 
evidence in support of its plan. That does not mean, however, . . . that 
reliance on an affirmative action plan is to be treated as an affirmative 
defense requiring the employer to carry the burden of proving the validity 
of the plan. The burden of proving its invalidity remains on the plaintiff.”163 
Second, the Court disagreed that an employer must show either actual, 
or a sufficient basis to believe, past discrimination by that employer:  “As 
Justice BLACKMUN’s concurrence [in Weber] made clear, Weber held that 
an employer seeking to justify the adoption of a plan need not point to its 
own prior discriminatory practices, nor even to evidence of an ‘arguable 
violation’ on its part.  Rather, it need point only to a ‘conspicuous . . . 
imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories.’”164 
Here, the Johnson majority refused to treat the “conspicuous 
imbalance” condition established in Weber as satisfied only when “it would 
support a prima facie case against the employer, as suggested in Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence.”  In an opinion concurring in the judgment, 
Justice O’Connor had taken this position, essentially extending to Title VII 
the required showing she articulated in her Wygant concurrence to establish 
the remedial purpose of public employers’ affirmative action plans.165 
 160. Id. at 25 n.21. 
 161. Id. at 40 (citations omitted). 
 162. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626. 
 163. Id. at 626-27. 
 164. Id. at 630 (citations omitted). 
 165. See id. at 649 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he employer must have had a firm basis for 
believing that remedial action was required. An employer would have such a firm basis if it can point to 
a statistical disparity sufficient to support a prima facie claim under Title VII by the employee 
beneficiaries of the affirmative action plan of a pattern or practice claim of discrimination.”). 
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The Johnson majority, however, concluded that applying that standard 
in Title VII cases “would be inconsistent with Weber's focus on statistical 
imbalance,” and could unduly discourage employers from adopting 
affirmative action plans: “A corporation concerned with maximizing return 
on investment, for instance, is hardly likely to adopt a plan if in order to do 
so it must compile evidence that could be used to subject it to a colorable 
Title VII suit.166  The Johnson majority further observed that had Weber 
itself “been concerned with past discrimination by the employer, it would 
have focused on discrimination in hiring skilled, not unskilled, workers, 
since only the scarcity of the former in Kaiser's work force would have 
made it vulnerable to a Title VII suit.”167 
The Ricci majority read Title VII in a way to contradict these necessary 
implications of Johnson.  First, the Ricci majority read into Title VII the 
very “strong basis’ rule from Wygant that the SG in Johnson had touted but 
that the Johnson Court refused to read into Title VII.  Second, the Ricci 
majority made that “strong basis” rule a defense to Title VII liability. 
Although the SG in Johnson had touted the parallel argument, as had the 
dissenting judge in the Johnson Ninth Circuit opinion, the Supreme Court 
in Johnson unequivocally rejected it. 
D.  Plausible Alternative Reasoning 
This section concludes that the Ricci majority could have but did not 
write a plausible alternative opinion that would not have eroded Weber or 
Johnson.  In that alternative, the “strong basis” rule from Wygant would 
have not been a defense to liability under section 703(a)(1), but an 
evidentiary standard for satisfying the employer’s burden of production 
under McDonnell Douglas doctrine. 
McDonnell Douglas doctrine governs the evidentiary burdens of 
proving a violation of section 703(a)(1) in a single motive case.  Once the 
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to 
the employer-defendant to provide a legitimate non-discriminatory reason 
for the firing, failure to hire or promote, or other adverse employment 
action.  If the employer satisfies that burden, the plaintiff must persuade 
that the proffered reason is pretext and the employer really acted because of 
the plaintiff’s race or other protected characteristic.168  As Johnson made 
clear, the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to Title VII challenges to 
affirmative action plans.169 
 166. Id. at 633. 
 167. Id. at 633 n.10. 
 168. St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-12 (1993); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). 
 169. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626-27. 
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The Ricci Court could have treated its “strong basis” rule as a special 
rule governing the conditions under which the employer satisfies its burden 
of production under McDonnell Douglas doctrine in those cases where an 
employer proffers the fear of disparate impact liability as its legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason.  If the employer demonstrated a “strong basis in 
evidence” to fear disparate impact liability, then the plaintiff must persuade 
that this motive was a pretext and that employer’s actual motive for the 
adverse action was illegitimate under Title VII. 
Under this approach, the Ricci majority could still have found that the 
plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment, albeit because the City could 
not satisfy its burden of production (because, according to the Court, on the 
record before it, the City so clearly could not show a “strong basis” for 
fearing Title VII disparate impact liability).  That approach is consistent 
with Johnson’s rejection of the “strong basis” rule as a defense and with 
Weber’s refusal to treat any employer consideration of race as sufficient to 
establish  section 703(a)(1) liability. 
E.  Departure from Judicial Commitments 
This section shows how, in its reasoning, the Ricci Court did not 
address plausible departures from professed commitments of some 
members of the Ricci majority to statutory interpretation that privileges the 
statutory text. 
This criterion, however, deserves much less weight in the analysis, for 
two reasons.  First, in reading statutes, recent Supreme Court Justices, 
including those in the Ricci majority, tend to join majority opinions that use 
a wide range of statutory interpretation techniques, including ones that they 
profess to disdain.  For opinions they write, there is still some, though less, 
divergence.170  Second, the Ricci opinion’s nominal author, Justice 
Kennedy, has not professed commitment to a “textualist” method of 
statutory interpretation to the same degree as others in the Ricci majority, 
such as Justice Scalia.171   
Accordingly, to the extent that one or more of the Ricci majority are 
committed to textualism, we should expect those Justices to push for the 
majority opinion to address, or opine separately to address, plausible 
 170. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An 
Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 221, 250-51 tbl. 2 (2011) (reporting individual 
Justice rates of reliance on interpretative tools and canons in the opinions they authored); see also 
FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 149-50 (2009) (mean 
scores by Justice for relying on “textualism” and other methods in statutory interpretation cases decided 
from 1994 through 2002). 
 171. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and the Laws in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 16-37 (1997). 
PANDYA MACRO 4 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2011  4:00:35 PM 
2010 DETECTING THE STEALTH EROSION OF PRECEDENT 319 
 
disjunctions between the Ricci majority’s reasoning and the text of section 
703(a)(1). 
This section identifies those plausible disjunctions.  Section 703(a)(1) 
provides, in relevant part, that it is an “unlawful employment practice” for 
an employer to "discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of 
such individual’s race.” The Ricci Court’s reasoning plausibly departs from 
the meaning of the phrase "because of such individual's race” in that section 
by (1) ignoring the role of the word “such”, and (2) treating the word 
“individual’s”, a singular possessive noun, as if it was a plural possessive 
noun.  No member of the Ricci majority addressed these plausible 
disjunctions. 
1.  Ignoring “Such” 
The Ricci majority ignored the word “such” in the phrase “such 
individual’s” in section 703(a)(1).  To see this, suppose only Benjamin 
Vargas, the Hispanic firefighter plaintiff, had sued.172  Since the Court 
granted all the plaintiffs summary judgment, including Mr. Vargas, we must 
suppose that, on the record, the Court thought that the City discriminated 
against Mr. Vargas in violation of Title VII, and that the Court would have 
granted Mr. Vargas summary judgment had he alone brought the Title VII 
suit.173  Under the Ricci majority's reading of section 703(a)(1), however, 
the City violated section 703(a)(1) when it refused to certify the test results 
because “the higher scoring candidates were white.”174 
As applied to Mr. Vargas’ Title VII claim, this ignores the word “such” 
in the phrase “such individual's” in section 703(a)(1).  Under existing norms 
of English grammar, the word “such,” which modifies “individual’s,” 
necessarily refers the reader back to a particular person—the “any 
individual” who is the direct object of the relevant verb "discriminate" in 
section 703(a)(1).  Accordingly, if the City’s refusal to certify the test 
results counts as discrimination against Mr. Vargas within the meaning of 
section 703(a)(1), and since the Ricci majority treated all the plaintiffs’ Title 
 172. Joint Appendix at 180, Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658, (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328), 2009 WL 454249, at 
*180 (hereinafter “Ricci JA”) (Amended Complaint ¶ 13) (“Benjamin Vargas is Hispanic.  All of the 
other plaintiffs are white.”); Ricci JA at 204 (Answer & Affirmative Defenses ¶ 13) (“Admit, upon 
information and belief, the plaintiffs’ self described ethnicity . . . .”). 
 173. The plaintiffs’ lawsuit was not a class action or under any other procedural vehicle for 
aggregating claims.  Under certain conditions, Title VII does not require identity between the plaintiff 
bringing a suit under Title VII and the individual or individuals allegedly harmed by a practice 
prohibited by Title VII.  See, e.g., Int’l Woodworkers of Am. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. 568 F.2d 64 (8th 
Cir. 1977) (labor union has Article III standing to bring Title VII claim on behalf of its members). 
 174. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2674. 
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VII claims as race discrimination claims,175 the City’s refusal must be 
discrimination against Vargas because of his race, i.e., because he is 
Hispanic. 
However, the Court's reading of section 703(a)(1) sustains Vargas’ 
claim based on a set of persons (“the higher scoring candidates”) whose 
race (white) is not his race (Hispanic), even though section 703(a)(1) does 
not say “because of race” or “because of any other individual's race.”  Nor 
does Mr. Vargas’ Title VII claim depend on adverse treatment because the 
City disapproved of his association with one or more third parties of 
another race.176 
This interpretative difficulty persists even if Mr. Vargas had argued 
that the City's refusal to certify the test results violated section 703(a)(2).177  
Unlike section 703(a)(1), section 703(a)(2) refers to the employer's 
“employees” (plural) as the direct objects of the employer action, and then 
connects that action to race.  Like section 703(a)(1), however, section 
703(a)(2) also contains the phrase “because of such individual's race.” 
Under this section, Mr. Vargas’ lawyer can easily argue that when the 
City sorted the test takers by score and race, and then identified a statistical 
race disparity, the City “limit[ed],” “segregated,” or “classif[ied]” that 
subset of its “employees” within the meaning of section 703(a)(2).  
 175. I proceed here as if the Court treated Mr. Vargas’ Title VII claim as only a race discrimination 
claim.  A plaintiff alleging discrimination because of his or her self-reported status as Hispanic could 
argue Title VII discrimination “because of such individual’s . . . national origin,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1), for which the term “national origin” means “the country where a person was born, or from 
which his or her ancestors came,” Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88 (1973).  See, e.g., 
Bennun v. Rutgers State University, 941 F.2d 154, 171-72 (3d Cir. 1991).  The Ricci plaintiffs did refer 
to “national origin” discrimination as part of their Title VII claims, albeit inconsistently.  Ricci JA, 
supra note 172, at 196 (Amended Complaint ¶ 62) (“[T]he City of New Haven, in depriving the 
plaintiffs of promotions and opportunities for promotions on account of their race, violated the plaintiffs' 
rights to be free from discrimination in employment on account of their race and/or national origin in 
violation of 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1), (2), and 3(b).”) (emphasis added).  The Ricci majority, however, 
acted as if all the plaintiffs had only brought Title VII race discrimination claims.  See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 
at 2673. 
 176. See, e.g., Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F.3d 130, 139 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[W]here an employee 
is subjected to adverse action because an employer disapproves of interracial association, the employee 
suffers discrimination because of the employee’s own race.”); Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. 
Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Where a plaintiff claims discrimination based upon an 
interracial marriage or association, he alleges, by definition, that he has been discriminated against 
because of his race.”). 
 177. That section provides that it is an “unlawful employment practice” for an employer to “to 
limit, segregate, or classify his employees . . . in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because 
of such individual's race . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(2). In their district court papers, the plaintiffs, 
discussing their Title VII claim, referred to both section 703(a)(1) and section 703(a)(2) of Title VII, but 
did not discuss the precise words of those provisions in any detail.  See Plaintiffs' Revised Memorandum 
of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment at 33-34, Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d 142, (No. 3:04cv1109), 2006 WL 776519 at 
*33-34.  The U.S. Supreme Court did not refer to section 703(a)(2). 
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Similarly, it is plausible that by refusing to then certify the test results, the 
City limited, segregated, or classified its employees "in a[ ] way" that 
“would deprive or tend to deprive” each plaintiff of "employment 
opportunities" or "adversely affect" each plaintiff's “status as an employee.”  
The premise here is that the City refusal to certify denied each Ricci 
plaintiff a promotion opportunity (an “employment opportunit[y]”), even if 
it did not necessarily guarantee enough vacancies for actual promotions to 
occur.178  The problem is that, in deciding whether that deprivation or 
adverse effect occurred "because of such individual’s race,” Mr. Vargas’ 
lawyer runs into the same problem as with section 703(a)(1): the 
deprivation or adverse effect did not depend on the fact that his race is 
Hispanic.  
For contrast, compare a case where a black job applicant sued a 
company that required job applicants to pass a company-administered 
generalized intelligence test.  If black applicants tended to fail that test at a 
substantially higher rate than white applicants, then it would be more likely 
than not that the black plaintiff would fail that test because he was black 
and, importantly, regardless of the race of the other job applicants.  
Accordingly, if the company could not show that the test was a good 
predictor of job performance, it is easy to conclude that the company’s 
generalized intelligence test requirement did “tend to deprive” the plaintiff 
of “employment opportunities” at the company because of his race.  
The point here is not to argue for the right or best way to read the 
statute.  Rather, if sincerely committed to textualism, the Ricci majority 
should have at least addressed plausible disjunctions between the majority 
opinion and the word “such” in section 703(a)(1).  Consider two possible 
responses. 
First, the City did adversely affect Mr. Vargas because of his race if we 
treat his race not only as Hispanic, but also “not black,” a race he shares 
with the other plaintiffs.  This response, however, works only if the City 
refused to certify the test results only because of the black pass rate (relative 
to the white pass rate) on the captain’s exam.  If the City was motivated by 
both the black and Hispanic pass rates (relative to the white pass rate) on 
that exam, then it is harder to argue that the City’s refusal to certify 
occurred because of Vargas’ race.  While Vargas continues to be “not 
black,” by definition Vargas’ race cannot be Hispanic and “not Hispanic” at 
the same time. 
Second, while Vargas must show that the City discriminated against an 
“individual” because of "such individual's" race under section 703(a), 
 178. The district court did not consider section 703(a)(2)’s focus on “employment opportunities,” 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2), when it found that “plaintiffs were not ‘deprived of promotions,’ ” reasoning 
that at best “the Rule of Three would give top scorers an opportunity for promotion, depending on the 
number of vacancies, but no guarantee of promotion,” Ricci, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 159-60. 
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Vargas need not show that he was that individual to obtain relief on his 
Title VII claim.  This response requires decoupling section 703(a), which 
defines conduct that counts as an unlawful employment practice, with Title 
VII’s enforcement provisions under section 706. 
The premise here is that the “individual” in section 703(a) need not be, 
or need not be represented by, the same individual “claiming to be 
aggrieved” by an unlawful employment practice that sections 706(b) and 
706(f) authorize to file an EEOC charge and a civil action, respectively.179 
Moreover, section 706(g), which authorizes court relief upon finding an 
unlawful employment practice “charged in the complaint,” does not 
expressly identify who may or may not receive such relief.180   If it had 
adopted this response, the Ricci majority would have resolved lower court 
disagreement over whether Title VII affords relief to an individual plaintiff 
who suffers from an employer action that discriminates because of 
somebody else's race or sex.181 
2.  “Individual’s” As Singular, Not Plural 
The Ricci majority treated the word “individual’s” in section 703(a)(1) 
as a plural possessive noun, when in fact it is a singular possessive noun.  
To see this, suppose only one white firefighter had sued and the issue is 
whether the City discriminated against him “because of” his race.  By the 
majority's reasoning, the City discriminated against this white firefighter 
plaintiff in violation of section 703(a)(1) when it acted because “the higher 
scoring candidates were white.”   
The interpretative difficulty is that the word "individual's" in "because 
of such individual's race" in section 703(a)(1) is a singular possessive noun, 
not plural possessive.  It is not “because of individuals' race,” which is 
consistent with the fact that “any individual,” the phrase to which “such 
individual's” refers, is also singular, not plural.  
 179. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-5(f)(1) 
 180. § 2000e-5(g)(1). 
 181. 2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 2-V(A)(2) (2000) (reading Title VII to permit filing of charge 
“by an individual who was not subjected to prohibited discrimination but was harmed by prohibited 
discrimination against others”)(footnote omitted)(citing cases).  Canvassing these cases, one 
commentator suggests that Ricci can be understood to have read Title VII to permit such claims, given 
how it treated Vargas’ claim.  See Kerri Lynn Stone, Ricci Glitch: The Unexpected Appearance of 
Transferred Intent in Title VII, 55 LOYOLA L. REV. 751, 784-89 (2010). On the other hand, Ricci did not 
necessarily resolve whether, for Vargas to prevail on his Title VII claim, the City needed to have acted 
because of Vargas’ race, either as a matter of statutory interpretation or prudential standing doctrine, 
because those issues were neither litigated nor jurisdictional.  The Ricci Court, however, necessarily 
concluded that Vargas had Article III standing, because such standing is necessary for federal court 
jurisdiction. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-231 (1990) (“[W]e are required to address 
the [standing] issue even if the courts below have not passed on it, and even if the parties fail to raise the 
issue before us.”) (citation omitted). 
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This matters, because to treat “individual’s” in section 703(a)(1) as 
singular, not plural, any hypothetical white firefighter plaintiff must at least 
show that the City refused to certify the test results “because of” his race 
(singular possessive), not the race and scores of all the white firefighter test-
takers who passed, i.e., not their race (plural possessive).   
For this to occur, that plaintiff must show that his race and test score 
caused the racial disparity in test outcomes to be large enough to have 
motivated the City to worry about Title VII disparate impact liability, i.e., 
to have satisfied the judicial rule of thumb derived from the Uniform 
Guidelines for Employee Selection Procedures. Those Guidelines provide 
that federal enforcement agencies generally regard a “selection rate for any 
race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty 
percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate . . . as evidence of 
adverse impact.”182 
This in turn depends on how a judge reads the phrase “because of” in 
section 703(a)(1).  In a 1989 dissenting opinion in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice Scalia and then-Chief Justice 
Rehnquist) argued that the phrase “because of” in section 703(a)(1) 
indicates a “but-for cause” requirement for liability: If an employer decides 
not to promote an individual “because of” her sex, her sex must be “a 
necessary element of the set of factors that caused the decision, i.e., a but-
for cause.”183  This view did not then clearly command a Court majority 
with respect to those cases in which the employer allegedly acted because 
of both permissible and impermissible motives (so-called “mixed-motives” 
cases).184  However, this view appears to prevail with respect to Title VII 
cases in which the employer allegedly acted only because of an 
impermissible motive.185  The Ricci plaintiffs pursued this latter kind of 
Title VII claim. 
 182. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D).  See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678 (“The pass rates of minorities . . . fall 
well below the 80-percent standard set by the EEOC to implement the disparate-impact provision of 
Title VII.”) (citations omitted).  For criticism of this rule as applied to Ricci, see Joseph L. Gastwirth & 
Weiwen Mao, Formal Statistical Analysis of the Data in Disparate Impact Cases Provides Sounder 
Inferences Than the U. S. Government's "Four-Fifths' Rule: An Examination of the Statistical Evidence 
in Ricci v. DeStefano, 8 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 171 (2009). 
 183. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 284 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see id. at 
262 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The legislative history of Title VII bears out what its 
plain language suggests: a substantive violation of the statute only occurs when consideration of an 
illegitimate criterion is the ‘but-for’ cause of an adverse employment action.”). 
 184. See id. at 241 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) 
 185. See, e.g., St. Mary’s Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 514 (“the required finding that the employer's 
action was the product of unlawful discrimination”) (majority opinion of Scalia, J.); cf. Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009) (reading by same Justices in the Ricci majority of the 
phrase “because of such individual’s age” in a parallel provision of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), to require but-for causation). 
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To apply the but-for cause reading of “because of” here requires posing 
a counterfactual:   For any particular white firefighter plaintiff, if that 
firefighter had been black, would the race disparity with respect to (1) exam 
pass rates, or (2) promotions to then-vacant positions, have fallen below the 
Guidelines’ eighty-percent threshold?  Given the actual exam results, we 
know that the black pass rate and the expected black promotion rate (to fill 
then-vacant positions) fell below the eighty percent threshold (Table 1).   
Table 2 calculates the pass rates and promotions in a hypothetical scenario 
in which we start with the actual pass rates (Table 1) and the ranks of the 
plaintiffs’ scores (Table A1, Appendix).  Then, for each exam, we switch 
the race of a single plaintiff from white to black. 
 
Table 2: Hypothetical Firefighter Exams, Pass Rates and Promotion186 
Race Pass Total Pass 
Rate 
Pass Rate 
Adverse 
Impact 
Ratio 
Promotion Promotion 
Adverse 
Impact 
Ratio 
Lieutenant's Exam       
  Black 7 19 36.8% 0.66 1 0.32 
  Hispanic 3 15 20.0% 0.36 0 0 
  White 24 43 55.8% . 7  
  Total 34 77 44.2% . 8  
Captain's Exam       
  Black 4 8 50.0% 0.83 1 0.78 to 0.52 
  Hispanic 3 8 37.5% 0.63 0 to 2 0 to 1.56 
  White 15 25 60.0% . 4 to 6  
  Total 22 41 53.7% . 7  
 
In this counterfactual scenario, whereas the black pass rate for the 
lieutenant’s exam continues to fall below the eighty-percent threshold 
(0.66), the black pass rate for the captain’s exam no longer does (0.83).187  
In other words, looking only at pass rates, each plaintiff who passed the 
captain’s exam, but no plaintiff that passed the lieutenant’s exam, can show 
that the City deprived him of a promotion opportunity because of his race 
(“such individual’s race”) within the meaning of section 703(a). 
In contrast, looking only at promotion to then-vacant positions, 
changing any single plaintiff from white to black does not push the adverse 
 
 186. Promotion assumes the City’s Rule of Three and that plaintiff is not ranked in the bottom three 
for each exam.  Promotion Adverse Impact Ratio is the minority promotion rate (number promoted / 
number of test-takers) divided by white promotion rate. 
 187. This ratio for the captain’s exam, however, falls below 0.80 for different calculations of the 
white pass rate.  See supra note 24 (note to Table 1). 
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impact ratio for promotion rates above the eighty-percent threshold.  None 
of the three lowest-ranked plaintiffs for each exam, had he been black, 
would have been promoted in any event, given their rank, the number of 
then-vacant positions, and the City Charter’s Rule of Three.  If any one of 
the other plaintiffs, if black, had been promoted, the number of blacks 
promoted for each exam would increase from zero to one, and the resulting 
adverse impact ratios would still fall below eighty percent. 
Again, the point here is not to argue for the right or best way to read 
the statute.  Rather, if sincerely committed to textualism, the Ricci majority 
should have at least addressed plausible disjunctions between the majority 
opinion and the statutory text.  Consider three possible responses. 
First, the Court might have considered whether the phrase “such 
individual’s race” in section 703(a)(1) also includes its plural form (such 
individuals’ race) by operation of the Dictionary Act: “In determining the 
meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise-- . . 
. words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, 
or things . . . ."188 
This argument turns on whether “context indicates otherwise” within 
the meaning of the Dictionary Act.189  The answer is not obvious.  Perhaps 
relevant is that Congress defined the word “person” in Title VII to include 
“one or more individuals,” but did not use any similar plural form in section 
703(a)(1).190  In the parallel provisions to section 703(a)(1) in sections 
703(b) and (c), which cover employment agencies and labor unions, the text 
varies slightly in ways that are consistent with the singular, not plural, 
possessive noun “individual’s” in section 703(a)(1).191 
Second, the Court could have decided that the City violated not section 
703(a)(1), but sections 703(l) or 703(h), which govern employment tests.  
Section 703(l), added in 1991, declares that it is unlawful for an employer 
selecting candidates for promotion “to adjust the scores of, use different 
cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results of, employment related tests 
on the basis of race. . . .”192  Section 703(h) provides, in pertinent part, that 
an employer may “act upon the results of any professionally developed 
 188. 1 U.S.C § 1. 
 189. See Rowland v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 201 (1993) (interpreting this phrase). 
 190. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). 
 191. In section 703(b), the text uses the singular possessive adjective "his," not the plural 
possessive adjective "their": It declares it unlawful for an employment agency to "discriminate against, 
any individual because of his race . . . , or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis 
of his race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (emphasis added).  In section 703(c), the parallel provision for 
labor organizations, section 703(c)(1) uses the singular possessive adjective "his" ("because of his 
race"), while section 703(c)(2), like its section 703(a)(2) counterpart, uses the singular possessive noun 
“individual's” (“because of such individual's race”).  § 2000e-2(c). 
 192. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(l); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 106, 105 Stat. 1071, 
1075. 
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ability test” except where such action is “designed, intended or used to 
discriminate because of race.”193 
The Court might have reasoned that by refusing to certify the test 
results, the City thereby “alter[ed]” those test results “on the basis of race” 
in violation of section 703(l).  Indeed, the plaintiffs’ lawyers suggested as 
much by drafting one of the questions presented in their Supreme Court 
certiorari petition to ask if an employer violates section 703(l) “when it 
rejects the results of such tests because of the race of the successful 
candidates.”194  Similarly, if the Court read “act upon the results” in section 
703(h) to cover the City’s refusal to certify the test results, then it could 
have concluded that the City acted upon the test results “to discriminate 
because of race” under that section. 
This approach in Ricci would have avoided the “such individual’s” 
difficulty of section 703(a)(1), because sections 703(l) and (h) do not 
restrict the “race” to which each section refers to that of any particular 
individual.  The direct object of the verbs in these sections are all plural 
(test scores and test results), not singular as in section 703(a)(1) (“any 
individual”).  This approach would have also avoided directly eroding 
Weber and Johnson, because those cases concerned violations under 
sections 703(a) and (d), not sections 703(l) or (h). 
To be sure, the Ricci Court did point to sections 703(l) and (h) as 
“consistent with” or “in keeping with,” respectively, its reading of section 
703(a)(1).  Pointing to section 703(l), the Ricci Court wrote that, absent 
proving a strong-basis defense, “[i]f an employer cannot rescore a test based 
on the candidates’ race, § [703](l), then it follows a fortiori that it may not 
take the greater step of discarding the test altogether to achieve a more 
desirable racial distribution of promotion-eligible candidates.”195  The Ricci 
Court also pointed to section 703(h) as “in keeping with” a restriction on 
“an employer’s ability to discard test results (and thereby discriminate 
against qualified candidates on the basis of their race).”196 
This reasoning, however, is opaque.  If discarding the test results is not 
“alter[ing]” those results under section 703(l), but a “greater step,” and thus 
categorically different, then section 703(l) does not apply.  If it is 
“alter[ing]” under section 703(l), it is still not clear how such a section 
703(l) violation would be “consistent with” the Court’s reading of section 
703(a)(1).  If a section 703(l) violation entails a section 703(a)(1) violation, 
 193. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(h). 
 194. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 894 (2009) (No. 08-328), 
2008 WL 4185424 at *i. 
 195. Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2676.  Though “more desirable racial distribution” is ambiguous, the City 
had alleged, and the Court so assumed, that the City had refused to certify the test results to avoid Title 
VII disparate impact liability. 
 196. Id. 
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as the Court may have assumed, then section 703(l) would be superfluous.  
To so assume also ignores that section 703(a)(1) uses the phrase “because 
of such individual's race,” while section 703(l) uses the phrase “on the basis 
of race.”  Similarly, for section 703(h) to be “in keeping with” the Court's 
reading of section 703(a)(1), one has to ignore that section 703(a)(1) uses 
“because of such individual's race,” while section 703(h) uses “because of 
race.” 
Third, the Ricci majority could have reasoned that “because of such 
individual’s race” in section 703(a)(1) has to be read in para materia with a 
new section 703(m) added in 1991: “Except as otherwise provided in this 
subchapter,” a plaintiff can establish “an unlawful employment practice” 
under Title VII by showing that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other 
factors also motivated the practice.”197  If the plaintiff pursues and proves a 
violation under this standard, and if the defendant shows that it would have 
“taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating 
factor,” then the statute limits the set of remedies available to the 
plaintiff.198  Section 703(m), unlike section 703(a)(1), does not expressly tie 
the protected characteristic to the individual who suffers from the 
challenged employment practice. 
Section 703(m)’s “motivating factor” standard, however, does not 
obviously supplant the conception of causation in the phrase “because of” 
in section 703(a)(1).  The phrase “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this 
subchapter” in section 703(m) covers section 703(a)(1), because section 
703(a)(1) appears in the same subchapter as section 703(m).  Moreover, 
earlier statements in Court opinions have suggested that section 703(m) 
only applies in cases where plaintiffs pursue so-called “mixed-motive” Title 
VII claims.199  Since the Ricci plaintiffs did not pursue such a claim,200 the 
Ricci majority would have had to decide whether the plaintiffs thereby 
forfeited any benefit of section 703(m).201 
 197. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m); see Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 107, 105 Stat. at 1075.  On the 
conception of causation adopted by this “motivating factor” standard, see Martin Katz, The 
Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 
GEO. L. J. 489, 503-07 (2006). 
 198. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
 199. See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994) (observing that section 107 of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 “responds to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), by setting 
forth standards applicable in ‘mixed motive’ cases”). 
 200. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 89 (2d Cir. 2008) (Calabresi, J., concurring in denial of 
rehearing in banc) (“The parties did not present a mixed motive argument to the district court or to the 
panel.”) (footnote omitted). 
 201. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which added section 703(m), Congress appears not to have 
intended to affect Weber or Johnson.  See § 116, 105 Stat. at 1079 (“Nothing in the amendments made 
by this title shall be construed to affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation 
agreements, that are in accordance with the law.”) (emphasis added); 137 Cong. Rec. 30683 (Nov. 7, 
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F.  Extrinsic Evidence 
This section collects evidence outside the Ricci opinion that is 
consistent with the view that the Justices in the Ricci majority would prefer 
to reduce the scope of Weber and Johnson. 
Justice Scalia called for Weber to be overruled in his Johnson 
dissent.202  There, Scalia also criticized Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in 
Johnson, which had called for a “firm basis” approach, as “something of a 
halfway house between leaving employers scot-free to discriminate against 
disfavored groups, as the majority opinion does, and prohibiting 
discrimination, as do the words of Title VII.”203  Scalia’s opinions in other 
cases204 and his off-the-bench statements205 also indicate a consistent and 
credible opposition to race-conscious affirmative action plans.  Before 
becoming a judge, Scalia had criticized Judge Wisdom’s dissent in Weber 
as forsaking white ethnics, like Scalia’s father, who had not discriminated 
against blacks and who, Scalia argued, would primarily suffer from 
affirmative action plans.206 
Similarly, before he became a judge, Clarence Thomas voiced 
opposition to race-conscious policies such as affirmative action 
programs.207  On the Court, his judicial voting record and opinions are 
consistent with such opposition.208  For Justices Roberts and Alito, their 
voting record in Equal Protection Clause cases seems to be consistent with 
an effective bar on race-conscious policies,209 either as a matter of policy 
preference or a sincere view of what the Equal Protection Clause demands.  
1991) (portion of interpretative memorandum concerning section 116) (“[T]his legislation should in no 
way be seen as expressing approval or disapproval of United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 
(1979), or Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), or any other judicial decision 
affecting court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation agreements.”); and 137 Cong. Rec. 
29040 (Oct. 30, 1991) (same for memorandum analysis of equivalent section in Senate bill). 
 202. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 673 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 203. Id. at 665 n.4. 
 204. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and in the judgment). 
 205. See, e.g., JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 159-60 (2009) (quoting interview with Scalia on opposition to 
affirmative action). 
 206. Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: ‘In order to get beyond racism, we must first take 
account of race’, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 147, 150-52 (1979). 
 207. See KEVIN MERIDA & MICHAEL A. FLETCHER, SUPREME DISCOMFORT: THE DIVIDED SOUL OF 
CLARENCE THOMAS 159-63 (2007) (describing statements by Thomas on affirmative action in early 
legal career in Reagan administration). 
 208. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
748-82 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 240 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and in 
the judgment). 
 209. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (plurality opinion of Roberts, C. J., joined by, among others, 
Alito, J.). 
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Justice Kennedy’s voting record in Equal Protection Clause cases supports 
a similar inference.21
Moreover, Roberts and Alito expressed opposition to affirmative action 
while working as government lawyers in the Reagan administration.  Alito, 
who had a “big hand” in writing the Solicitor General’s brief in Wygant,211 
later wrote in a 1985 job application for a deputy position in the Justice 
Department that he had been honored and personally satisfied to “help 
advance legal positions in which I personally believe very strongly,” and 
that he was “particularly proud of my contributions in recent cases in which 
the government has argued in the Supreme Court that racial and ethnic 
quotas should not be allowed.”212 
Similarly, in December 1981, Roberts, then a special assistant to 
Attorney General William French Smith, wrote to Smith about how to bring 
the Department of Labor and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance 
“into line with our views stressing color and sex blindness in employment 
decisions.”  In so doing, Roberts anticipated that those agencies might argue 
that “the [Department of] Justice view of Title VII – that it requires color 
blindness in employment decisions –- was rejected in Weber.”  Roberts 
offered an answer: “Weber did not consider government pressure, but only 
a private program.  It also has only four supporters on the current Supreme 
Court.  We have difficulties with its reasoning, and do not accept it as the 
guiding principle in this area.”213  In counting “four supporters,” Roberts 
left out Potter Stewart, part of the Weber majority, because Stewart had left 
 
 210. See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 395 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); League of 
United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.); Miller 
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911-15 (1995) (majority opinion of Kennedy, J.); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 
497 U.S. 547, 631 (1990) (Kennedy, J., with whom Scalia, J., joins, dissenting); J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. at 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  See FRANK J. COLUCCI, 
JUSTICE KENNEDY’S JURISPRUDENCE: THE FULL AND NECESSARY MEANING OF LIBERTY 106-120 
(2009) (describing Justice Kennedy’s opinions in Equal Protection Clause race cases). 
 211. Panel of Former Solicitor Generals, Rex E. Lee Conference on the Office of the Solicitor 
General of the United States, 2003 BYU L. Rev. 153, 179 (statement by Charles Fried: “There was . . .  
the brief in the Wygant case. I had a big hand in writing it, and so did Sam Alito, who had this 
marvelous phrase saying that a particular African American baseball player would not have served as a 
great role model if the fences had been pulled in every time he was up at bat  . . .”)(footnote omitted).  
For the phrase Fried attributed to Alito, see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 23, Wygant, 476 U.S. 267 (No. 84-1340), 1985 WL 669739 at *23.  
 212. Attachment to Personal Qualifications Statement, Form SF 171, Nov. 15, 1985, Folder “Alito, 
Jr., Samuel A.,” Box OA 18576, Presidential Personnel Office of: Records Files, Ronald Reagan 
Library, Simi Valley, CA. 
 213. Memorandum from John Roberts to Attorney General, Dec. 2, 1981, p.2, Folder “Affirmative 
Action,” Box 112 (Entry 42 P), Subject Files of Special Assistant John G. Roberts, 1981-92, Records of 
the Office of the Attorney General, RG 60, National Archives, College Park, MD. 
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the court that July and Sandra Day O’Connor had filled the vacancy that 
September.214 
To be sure, Roberts and Alito, young lawyers at the time, may have 
mostly wanted to write what they thought their superiors wanted to read.  In 
any event, I have found no evidence to suggest that they, or any other 
member of the Ricci majority, prefer Weber and Johnson in particular or 
voluntary affirmative action plans in general. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper offered and applied a method for detecting stealth precedent 
erosion to show that in Ricci, the Court likely wrote the majority opinion in 
such a way as to erode Weber and Johnson by stealth to make it easier to 
later expressly limit the circumstances under which Title VII permits 
voluntary affirmative action plans.  In so doing, the paper has identified an 
important development in how courts treat such plans.  The paper has also 
contributed to research on the stare-decisis norm by offering a method for 
identifying stealth precedent erosion.   
Once we know when stealth precedent erosion has occurred, we can 
test hypotheses as to why courts adopt that strategy over other ways to 
handle precedent.  In some cases, the reason may be unique to the case.  
Perhaps the Ricci Court eroded Weber and Johnson by stealth to avoid 
sending a strong hostile signal during the first year of the first black 
President’s administration and during the then-pending nomination to the 
Supreme Court of Sonia Sotomayor, who had been on the Second Circuit 
panel that affirmed the district court’s judgment in Ricci.215 
However, stealth precedent erosion may also occur more often in, for 
example, statutory cases where a judge in the majority with a pivotal vote 
believes that Congress will react negatively to an express diminution of 
precedent x and is likely to supplant that decision by legislation.216  
Moreover, intermediate appellate courts may erode precedent by stealth 
more often.  For example, in federal courts of appeal, a panel majority may 
prefer to ignore contrary circuit precedent rather than confront it, 
particularly in circuits that rarely grant petitions for en banc rehearing.  
These and other hypotheses must wait to be tested until we learn, with the 
help of the method presented here, when, where, and how often stealth 
precedent erosion has occurred. 
 214. Retirement of Justice Stewart, 453 UNITED STATES REPORTS vii (1983); Appointment of 
Justice O’Connor, 453 UNITED STATES REPORTS xi (1983). 
 215. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 216. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?: Playing the Court/Congress/President 
Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613, 651-52 (1991) (suggesting prospect of legislative override as 
explanation for Burger Court’s less conservative decisions in statutory civil rights cases as compared to 
constitutional civil rights cases). 
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Exams217 
tiff Race Sc e Rank 
APPENDIX 
Table A1: Race, Score, and Rank of Ricci Plaintiffs on Firefighter 
Plain or
Lieutenant's Exam    
  Greg Boivin White 90.10 1 
  Frank Ricci White 84.10 6 
  Michael Christoforo 
y 
o 
arker 
Sean Patton White 73.33 21 
rcarelli 92.81 
rdella 
Hispanic 
Thomas J. Michaels White 71.35 20 
White 82.73 7 
  Michael Blatchle White 82.73 8 
  Steven Durand White 82.50 9 
  Mark Vendett White 81.93 10 
  Ryan Divito White 79.43 11 
  Christopher P White 76.90 13 
  
    
Captain's Exam    
  Matthew Ma White 1 
  Brian Jooss White . 2 
  Timothy Scanlon White 85.15 3 
  William Gamba White 80.88 5 
  Gary Carbone White 79.68 6 
  Benjamin Vargas 79.68 7 
  Edward Riordan White 76.91 10 
  John Vendetto White 76.45 11 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 217. Scores and ranks from Plaintiffs’ Exhibits, vol. V: Ex. A (Ricci Aff., Dec. 16, 2005, ¶ 21); Ex. 
B (Blatchley Aff., Nov. 18, 2005, ¶¶ 8-9); Ex. C (Boivin Aff., Nov. 18, 2005, ¶¶ 7-8); Ex. D (Carbone 
Aff., Nov. 18, 2005, ¶¶ 8-9); Ex. E (Christoforo Aff., Nov. 18, 2005, ¶¶ 10-11); Ex. F (Divito Aff., Nov. 
18, 2005, ¶¶ 9-10); Ex. G (Durand Aff., Nov. 18, 2005, ¶¶ 10-11); Ex. H (Gambardella Aff., Nov. 18, 
2005, ¶¶ 8-9); Ex. I (Jooss Aff., Dec. 16, 2005, ¶¶ 9-10); Ex. J (Marcarelli Aff., Nov. 23, 2005, ¶ 10 
(“total score of 92.81% [sic]”); id. ¶ 11; Ex. K (Michaels Aff., Nov. 18, 2005, ¶¶ 8-9); Ex. L (Patton 
Aff., Nov. 18, 2005, ¶¶ 8-9); Ex. M (Parker Aff., Nov. 18, 2005, ¶ 8) (“total score of 76.90% [sic]”); id. 
¶ 9; Ex. N (Riordan Aff. Nov. 18, 2005, ¶¶ 8-9); Ex. O (Scanlon Aff., Nov. 23, 2005, ¶¶ 8-9); Ex. P 
(Vargas Aff., Nov. 18, 2005, ¶¶ 10-11); Ex. Q (John Vendetto Aff., Nov. 18, 2005, ¶ 8) (reporting score 
“for promotion to the rank of Lieutenant [sic]”); id. ¶ 9 (reporting rank on “eligibility list for promotion 
to the rank of Captain”); Ex. R (Mark Vendetto Aff., Nov. 18, 2005, ¶¶ 8-9); and Ricci JA 184 
(Amended Complaint ¶ 25).  Race from Ricci JA 180 (Amended Complaint ¶ 13); Ricci JA 204 
(Answer & Affirmative Defenses ¶ 13); and Plaintiffs’ Exhibits, vol. V, Ex. P, Vargas Aff., Nov. 18, 
2005, ¶ 1 (“I am Hispanic.”).   In his affidavit, Jooss did not report his composite score, only the oral 
score (80) and written score (95).  See Ex. I (Jooss Aff., Dec. 16, 2005, ¶ 9). 
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